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ABSTRACT 
 
Capital Controls and External Debt Term Structure. (August 2005) 
Eza Ghassan Al-Zein, B.A., American University of Beirut, Lebanon 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Leonardo Auernheimer 
 
 
 
In my dissertation, I explore the relationship between capital controls and the choice 
of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, incorporating 
explicitly the role of international lenders. I look at specific types of capital controls 
which take the form of date-specific and maturity-specific reserve requirements on 
external borrowing. I consider two questions: How is the maturity structure of external 
debt determined in a world general equilibrium? What are the effects of date- and 
maturity-specific reserve requirements on the maturity structure of external debt? Can 
they prevent a bank run? 
I develop a simple Diamond-Dybvig-type model with three dates. In the low income 
countries, banks arise endogenously. There are two short-term bonds and one long-term 
bond offered by the domestic banks to international lenders. First I look at a simple 
model were international lending is modeled exogenously. I consider explicitly the 
maturity composition of capital inflows to a domestic economy. I show that the holdings 
of both short-term bonds are not differentiated according to date.  
Second, I consider international lending behavior explicitly. The world consists of 
two large open economies: one with high income and one with low income. The high 
 iv
income countries lend to low income countries. There exist multiple equilibria and some 
are characterized by relative price indeterminacy. 
Third, I discuss date-specific and maturity- specific reserve requirements. In my 
setup reserve requirements play the role of a tax and the role of providing liquidity for 
each bond at different dates. I show that they reduce the scope of indeterminacy. In some 
equilibria, I identify a case in which the reserve requirement rate on the long-term debt 
must be higher than that on the short-term debt for a tilt towards a longer maturity 
structure. 
Fourth, I introduce the possibility of an unexpected bank run. I show that some 
specific combination of date-and maturity-specific reserve requirements reduce the 
vulnerability to bank runs. With regard to the post-bank-run role of international lenders, 
I show that international lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the 
bank after the occurrence of a bank run. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
[…] the right starting point for thinking about capital controls must be on 
very focused, temporary measures aimed at stemming massive temporary 
inflows or outflows of debt. (Rogoff, 2002, ¶ 6) 
After the financial crises of the 1990s, preventing large speculative and volatile 
inflows of short-term debt became a major concern. Following the spread of 
liberalization policies in the 1990’s, many developing countries have seen their private 
and financial sectors accumulate high short term borrowing. The increase in private 
short-term borrowing resulted in a situation where the private sector became unable to 
fully service the debt without new borrowing. This phenomenon is identified as short-
term over-borrowing by the private sector. With high inherited short-term debt, any new 
borrowing becomes costlier. A debt overhang arises wherein the expected present value 
of output is lower than the accumulated debt. The private sector with a debt overhang 
signals its inability to pay back its debt and therefore may not be able to get any new 
borrowing. This in turn leads to default crises, bank runs or speculative attacks. 
Theoretical findings and the Mexican experience of 1994 suggested the importance of 
the maturity structure of external debt and the benefits of debt with longer maturity to 
prevent debt-related financial crises. Thus in the spirit of the quote by Rogoff (2002), the 
study of capital controls became popular again. The success of the Chilean experience 
with reserve requirements on external debt brought increasing attention to the use of 
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these types of capital controls. Despite the extensive literature analyzing capital controls 
and external debt the issue of reserve requirements on external borrowing, as a type of 
capital controls has received little attention. In my dissertation I look at how the maturity 
structure of private external debt is endogenously determined and the role of date- and 
maturity- specific reserve requirements in preventing bank runs.  
How is the maturity structure of external debt determined? How are policies of 
capital controls on the external debt flows documented in the literature? What is the 
impact of capital controls on the composition of debt? Can they reduce the vulnerability 
to a bank run? To answer these questions, in this chapter I will first look at how the over-
borrowing syndrome of short-term debt has been looked at in the existing literature on 
financial crises and how the maturity and interest rate term structure was considered in 
these models. Second I will review the controversial existing results regarding the effect 
of capital controls. There I will look specifically at how capital controls that take the 
form of date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements on external borrowing have 
been considered in the literature. 
Note that theoretical work on debt crises has taken different turns over the last three 
decades. The first-generation models on crises have focused on the relation between 
fiscal deficit of governments and the resulting collapse of exchange rates (Krugman, 
1979). The second-generation models started to explain currency crises as the result of 
investors’ panic regarding the central bank’s holding of international reserves to backup 
the exchange rate peg. Devaluation policies or the abandonment of the peg become self-
fulfilling prophecies (Obstfeld, 1994). There the choice of government debt maturity was 
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exogenous, when considered. The Mexican 1994 crisis and subsequent widespread 
financial crises throughout the 1990s shifted the analysis from developing standard 
models of governments’ management of debt and exchange rate regimes to analyzing the 
performance of the private sector. The third-generation models attempt to explain how 
the inflows and outflows of capital can drive both a currency crisis and/or a financial 
crisis. Within this strand of models, different approaches have been undertaken (See 
Chang and Velasco, 2000 and Aizenman and Turnovsky, 2002). In section I.1, I 
summarize the explanations regarding the choice of the maturity structure. In section I.2, 
I look at how the role of capital controls has been documented. Finally, section I.3 
summarizes the findings of each chapter in the dissertation. 
I.1. On the choice of the maturity structure of external debt  
With the financial crises of the 1990s, and the Mexican crisis in 1994, the literature 
on crises shifted attention towards analyzing private flows of capital. In addition, looking 
at the behavior of investors and firms became necessary. One strand in the literature on 
the debt overhang in the late 1980s and early 1990s has developed models in which the 
country is treated like a firm. In Krugman (1988) and Bulow and Rogoff (1991), there is 
a high inherited debt of a country that is higher than the expected present value of its 
future stream of resources. In these types of models the debt is inherited and the maturity 
structure is not originally a choice variable. Lamont (1995) introduces the role of beliefs 
in a model with debt overhang. In his model he introduces two types of inherited debt: 
one with long-term maturity and one with short-term maturity, along with an exogenous 
maturity structure.  
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Another strand in the debt literature has looked at the relationship between asset 
prices and the debt accumulation of firms to explain why over-borrowing occurs. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Auernheimer and Garcia-Saltos (2000) suggest that the 
presence of collateral magnifies the effect of transitory productivity shocks on asset 
prices and thus on consumption. The major common chain in the above cited literature is 
that over-borrowing becomes a vicious circle due to under-accumulation of capital and 
high accumulated debt that is maturing. The problem is exacerbated by the need for new 
financing that is available only at high interest rate. The interest rate on the debt usually 
reflects the expectations regarding the ability of borrowers to repay the debt. The 
classical definition of the interest rate given by Fisher (1930) as an “index of impatience” 
suggests that the interest rate on the short-term debt is lower than on the long-term debt 
because it carries less risk of default (pp. 52-53). However, such a definition is not in 
tune with theoretical findings that suggest the importance of longer maturity structure to 
avoid crises. Keynes (1935) perceived the interest rate as the “reward for parting with 
liquidity”(pp.167). Diamond (1991) suggests a model in which the choice of debt 
maturity reflects a trade-off between “liquidity risk” in the short-term and “a preference 
for short-term debt due to private information about credit rating” (pp.709). A borrower 
with high credit rating prefers short-term debt. A borrower with somewhat low to middle 
credit rating would prefer long-term debt. A borrower with very low credit rating would 
prefer to hide his type and thus borrow short-term debt. Despite the relation of the 
maturity structure to liquidity risk and credit rating, in this model, only the borrowers’ 
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decisions are modeled explicitly. There, the behavior of lenders and interest rates on debt 
are assumed to be exogenous. 
Several papers based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have analyzed the behavior of 
domestic banks in choosing their debts and the debt maturity structure. Originally, 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explain how banks subject to runs can attract deposits in a 
closed economy. They recommend government deposit insurance to produce superior 
contracts. In Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002), despite considering the indebtedness of 
the private sector, there is no role for a bank in their model because uncertainty arises 
from an aggregate shock and not the lack of information. Chang and Velasco (2000) 
develop a model with a small open economy in which they show that bank runs are 
associated with high short-term debt. They provide a set-up for a small open economy 
that captures the endogenous term structure along with an endogenous financial 
intermediary. Nevertheless, their analysis focuses only on the borrower’s behavior. 
However in a general equilibrium context, the maturity structure of the debt should be 
the outcome of the behaviors of both lenders and borrowers. Allowing for only one type 
of bond-- a short-term bond-- Seo (2003) finds that there always exists an equilibrium 
with pessimistic foreign investors who make bank runs the equilibrium strategy for 
domestic agents. 
For the purpose of comparison across modeling techniques, it is important to touch 
on how the term structure of debt has been explored in a parallel literature related to 
governments’ default and sovereign debt rather than the debt of the private sector. In a 
partial equilibrium framework Calvo and Guiddotti (1990) show that long-term debt 
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becomes optimal only with some pre-commitment and indexation of the domestic debt. 
If there is no indexation, the optimal maturity for the debt is short term, due to the 
possibility of using inflation to wash out its nominal debt. Another approach is presented 
by Jeanne (2004). He uses a game theoretic framework in which efforts of having good 
or bad policy to increase or decrease the probability of high output conditional on a bad 
signal are within the utility function of a country. In his model international creditors’ 
behavior is not explicitly formalized. “A risky [short-term] debt induces the country to 
implement a good policy by making bad policy relatively costly” (Jeanne, 2004, pp.10). 
This is parallel to the commitment problem that leads to short-term debt being optimal in 
Calvo and Guidotti (1990). In contrast, by exogenously imposing various maturity 
structures, Cole and Kehoe (2000) show that a longer maturity structure of the prevailing 
debt can reduce the possibility of a crisis by reducing the new borrowing needed by the 
government at each period from international lenders. In their model a general 
equilibrium framework with risk neutral international lenders and a domestic government 
is used. However the maturity structure is exogenously imposed. 
To sum up, at least three features would be desirable in an environment to analyze an 
endogenous maturity structure: First, for the framework to have a structure in which it is 
not clear that short-term debt is preferred to long-term, liquidity risk must be present. 
Second, for the choice to be explicit between short-term and long-term debt, the 
possibility of issuing long-term and short-term debt simultaneously should be 
considered. Third to understand why new lending would be provided or not, the behavior 
of international lenders has to be considered in a world general equilibrium. The 
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literature has looked at the first two features described above, but none of the existing 
models have endogenized the interest rates and therefore they have not considered 
lenders’ behavior explicitly.  
It is true that for a debtor who pays interest, the interest is, to him, a real 
cost, and is debited on his books. But we need only to be reminded of the 
debit and credit bookkeeping of the first chapter to see that this item is 
counterbalanced on the books of the creditor, to whom this interest is by no 
means a cost, but on the contrary an item of income. (Fisher, 1930, pp.540) 
In tune with the quote by Fisher (1930), a complete model for debt has to consider a 
general equilibrium environment in which the interest rate falls as a cost on borrowers 
and a return to lenders.  
In the following section, I give a review on the mixed results in the literature 
regarding capital controls.  
I.2. Capital controls 
Volatile short-term borrowing has marked many default crisis episodes in the 1990’s. 
The fundamental feature of the 1990’s is the rapid growth of private short-term debt in 
developing countries. In addition the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves 
became quite high. In fact, capital inflows to developing countries faced strong reversals 
in 1997 and 1998. This indicates that the growth in short-term debt made developing 
economies more susceptible to liquidity runs (Dadush et al., 2000). In addition to the 
volatile aspect of short-term debt, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that banking 
crises are features of the crises in the 1980’s and 1990’s but not in the 1970s, when 
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financial markets were still highly regulated. They report the probability of a currency 
crisis conditioned on the beginning of a banking crisis as 46% when the reported 
unconditional probability is 29%. In their survey, most of the banking crises precede 
balance of payment crises. In fact, they find a link between financial liberalization and 
banking crisis: “[In] 18 out of the 26 banking crises studied (...), the financial sector had 
been liberalized during the preceding five years, usually less” (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999, pp.480). As pointed by Rogoff (2002) and Chang and Velasco (2000), debt crises 
related to large capital inflows in an open economy context are structurally related to the 
maturity structure. In tune with the quote by Rogoff (2002), the benefits of capital 
controls are in preventing short-term volatile debt flows. 
Theoretically, the answer on the benefit of capital controls is not really straight 
forward because as much as it prevents excessive short-term debt ex-ante, it puts more 
constraint on the provision of liquidity ex-post. In other words, the reserve requirements 
could play the role of liquidity or liquidity guarantee for any issuance of debt ex-ante, 
and therefore may prevent a crisis ex-ante. But in the event of a liquidity shock, short-
term borrowing becomes more difficult when reserve requirements are imposed and 
therefore might create a constraint to the role of short-term borrowing as a liquidity 
provider. These two effects working in opposite directions are consistent with 
controversial results related to the benefits or losses regarding capital controls. Diamond 
and Rajan (2000) argue against capital requirements. Moreover, Reinhart and Smith 
(2002) studied the effect of temporary controls on capital inflows. In the second part of 
their paper, they analyzed it in the presence of the over-borrowing distortion. They 
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derived the optimal tax rate on capital inflows. After calibrating the model, they find that 
temporary capital controls need to be very high to be effective.  The welfare benefits of 
such taxes are estimated to be very low. 
Analyzing the effects of reserve requirements without considering the maturity 
structure of the bond may be missing a fundamental chain: the tilt of the maturity 
structure of the debt. It is only in the prevention of destabilizing short-term capital 
inflows that capital controls could be effective in removing crises. Aizenman and 
Turnovsky (2002) analyze the effect of reserve requirements in a model with only short-
term debt. The work by Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002) analyzing the effect of reserve 
requirements on borrowing, stands as an exception. They model a default crisis as 
endogenous to sovereign risk and moral hazard considering the behavior of both risk-
neutral lenders and borrowers. They show the benefit of reserve requirements in reducing 
the probability of default and thus increasing welfare. However, their model does not 
focus on the dual aspect of this type of capital control: yet the expression “reserve 
requirement” suggests a dual role of this type of capital controls: the “reserve” function, 
i.e. the role of “liquidity provider”, and the requirement constraining function, i.e. the 
role of a tax.  The first role would presumably be important in preventing default crises. 
Although the second role secures from over-borrowing, it may prevent the provision of 
liquidity in the event of a crisis. In addition, short-term debt constitutes an important 
source of liquidity for domestic banks; reserve requirements may have the adverse effect 
of reducing such role. Accordingly, it is impossible in the Aizenman and Turnovsky 
(2002) model to capture the dual feature of short-term borrowing: On one hand as a de-
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stabilizer and on the other as a liquidity provider. In fact, De Gregorio et al. (2000) show 
that, in Chile, such policies have tilted the maturity composition of capital inflows 
towards longer maturity structure. Chile’s financial liberalization dates since 1974. It had 
a banking crisis in September 1981 that peaked in March 1983. The closest balance of 
payment crisis was in August 1982 (Reinhart and Kaminsky, 1999). In the 1990’s, Chile 
did not experience any financial crisis. Among many sound monetary policies, the 
literature explaining the success of the Chilean case refers to the use of reserve 
requirements as capital controls. In January 1992, 20 percent reserve requirements were 
imposed on deposits and loans in foreign currency held by commercial banks. The 
reserves had to be maintained for one year. In May 1992, the rate was increased to 30 
percent and it was set such that the reserve requirement rate fell as the maturity 
increased. In September 1998, a year marked by financial crisis in other Latin American 
countries, the rate of reserve requirement was set to zero. The share of private debt in 
Chile in the 1990’s has increased. In addition, short-term debt share has decreased 
significantly from 19.41% in 1990 to 5.08% in 1998 (Reinhart and Reinhart, 1999 and 
De Gregorio et al., 2000). 
The above suggests that a rigorous analysis of reserve requirements should consider 
not only the maturity structure of external private debt, but also the behavior of banks 
and international lenders in the external debt market. 
I.3. Overview of dissertation chapters 
In my dissertation, I explore the relationship between capital controls and the choice 
of external debt maturity, in a general equilibrium setup, with endogenous international 
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lenders’ behavior. More specifically I extend the basic Chang and Velasco (2000) 
framework to a general equilibrium model in which international lending is endogenous 
and analyze the effects of capital controls that take the form of reserve requirements on 
external borrowing. I develop a simple Diamond-Dybvig-type model with three dates 
and a two-period planning horizon. In the low-income countries, banks or coalitions of 
depositors arise endogenously. There are two short-term bonds and one long-term bond 
offered by the domestic banks. There is a single good each period, which is 
homogeneous across countries. This good cannot be produced: this is an endowment or 
pure exchange economy. The good is perishable if not invested or consumed. There is an 
investment technology that yields a real gross rate of return 1>R  at t=2, but produces 
only r  units of the good if liquidated earlier at t=1, where Rr <2 . The environment is 
characterized by liquidation costs at t=1. In chapter II, exogenous lending behavior is 
assumed. In chapter III, international lenders’ behavior is considered explicitly. In 
chapter IV, date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements are imposed on the 
domestic economy’s borrowing. In all chapters II, III, and IV, there is no bank run. In 
chapter V, I introduce the possibility of an unexpected bank run at t=1. In chapter V, I 
first look at what combination of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements can 
prevent a bank run. Second, when a bank run occurs, I explore the re-optimizing 
behavior of international lenders in deciding whether to bailout the borrowing bank. 
I.3.1. Chapter II 
In chapter II, for comparability, a la Chang and Velasco (2000), international lending 
behavior is not explicitly modeled, and I impose upper limits on the borrowing by 
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domestic borrowers. Unlike Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002), I consider explicitly the 
maturity composition of capital inflows.  
First, when I allow for an environment with a rich maturity structure, the scope for 
locally-unique multiple equilibria increases even when credit is rationed. I also show that 
the scope of multiple equilibria and the ranking of utility across different types of 
equilibria depend on the opportunity cost of liquidation. Second with exogenous lending, 
it is impossible to generate equilibria with high demand for one of the short-term bonds 
without generating high demand for the other short-term bond. Third, credit rationing is 
exogenous when credit limits are imposed. The holdings of both short-term bonds are not 
differentiated according to date. However, to capture in a nontrivial manner the idea that 
capital controls are not only maturity-specific but also date-specific, I need to look at the 
behavior of international lenders as well. 
I.3.2 Chapter III 
This chapter is the foundation for chapters IV and V. Here I consider international 
lenders’ behavior explicitly. The world consists of two blocks of large open economies: 
The high income and low-income countries’ blocks. The low-income countries have the 
same technology and consumption schemes described in chapter II. The high-income 
countries benefit from lending to low-income countries. In the high-income block, it is 
assumed that the international creditors are homogeneous. There are two short-term 
bonds and one long-term bond offered by the domestic banks in the low-income 
countries to international lenders in the high-income countries.  
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After I solve both the international lenders and the domestic bank problems, I derive 
multiple sets of equilibria. In the world general equilibrium, the interest rates will be 
such that markets clear. Accordingly, the equilibrium term structure of the debt will be 
determined. The difficulty with this type of models is that results are usually 
characterized by multiple equilibria. In addition, sometimes within each set of multiple 
equilibria, there arises indeterminacy of relative interest rates. I use the concept of 
indeterminacy to characterize each set of equilibria. 
When I allow for endogenous lending behavior, credit rationing will emerge 
endogenously. The analytical description of equilibria and the simulation results show 
that cases, where there is high demand for either of the short-term bonds can exist for 
high gross return of investment R . This is different from the results obtained with 
exogenous lending for two reasons: First with exogenous lending, low R  entails a lower 
cost of liquidation and thus the equilibrium with only short-term debt arises. In chapter 
III, a lower R  implies both a lower cost of liquidation and lower interest rates paid to 
international lenders at t=1. Thus with endogenous lending interest rates incorporate both 
the Keynesian concept of interest rate as the “reward of parting for liquidity” and 
Fisher’s view of interest rate as “impatience factor”. The tilt towards longer or shorter 
maturity will depend on the equilibrium interest rates. In the following chapter I look at 
possible equilibria under reserve requirements imposed on the bank. 
I.3.3 Chapter IV 
In chapter IV, I explore how imposing date- and maturity-specific reserve 
requirements may affect the scope of indeterminacy of different equilibria. A date- and 
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maturity- specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the amount borrowed by private 
agents that has to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. 
When the bond matures, the central bank returns the reserves. 
Note that at the interior solution without reserve requirements, there was an 
indeterminate set of the quantities. The number of equilibrium combination of quantities 
was infinite. Different combinations of non-zero reserve requirements cause bifurcations, 
a change in number of equilibria, towards either two equilibria or a unique equilibrium. 
This depends on what combinations of date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements 
is chosen. A bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium arises if and only if the reserve 
requirement on the long-term debt is higher than that on the second short-term bond 
issued at t=1, which in turn is higher than that on the initial short-term bond issued at 
t=0. The intuition is that the liquidity role of reserve requirements dominates the tax role. 
There are two reasons for this result: First, in this model, liquidation is costly in the 
short-term, thus the role of liquidity provision is crucial at t=1. Second, I have 
incorporated the behavior of risk-averse international lenders, who may see in high 
reserve requirements an indication of the capability of borrowers to pay some of the loan. 
Simulation results show that for some parameter ranges, a set of date- and maturity- 
specific reserve requirements, which yield a unique equilibrium, can improve welfare of 
domestic depositors and international lenders. It is also shown that international lenders 
are always worse off when reserve requirements lead to a bifurcation to two equilibria. 
The association of bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium with the possibility of 
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welfare improvement implies that there might be an association between higher utility 
and higher determinacy. 
I.3.4 Chapter V 
In this chapter I analyze the vulnerability to a bank run of equilibria identified in the 
model I describe in chapters III and IV. A bank run follows from the unexpected 
realization of a bad dream, which makes it optimal for all domestic agents to withdraw 
from the domestic bank. If an unexpected bad dream is seen by domestic depositors at 
t=1 and the bank position signals that it is unable to pay back all the withdrawals i.e. it is 
in an illiquid position, a bank run will occur. This chapter addresses two questions: Does 
the imposition of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements on external debt 
reduce vulnerability to a bank run? Do international lenders bail out the domestic banks 
after a bank run occurs? To address these questions, I explore whether or not the 
domestic banks hold an illiquidity position. If the bank’s position is illiquid, the domestic 
depositors would run to the bank if they have a bad dream. In addition, in the case of a 
bank run, I look at how international lenders may deviate from their original plans of 
lending. In particular, I explore whether they would be willing to give any new lending 
to bailout the domestic banks. Finally I illustrate each case within each section with 
simulation results from numerical examples. Interestingly one can identify that the 
combination of reserve requirements that creates a bifurcation towards a unique 
equilibrium is always not vulnerable to a bank run. 
Why would international lenders be willing to lend at 1=t ? Their outside option is 
not to get back anything of their loans. Since long-term debt is paid back at 2=t , they 
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are willing to bail out the bank to retrieve the long term debt. Following the occurrence 
of a bank run, international lenders may find it optimal to deviate from the plan at t=0. 
Thus they re-optimize. Simulation results show that at 0=t , the anticipated net new 
lending is higher than the actual new lending at 1=t . The new lending will only be 
provided if the actual value of total debt at t=2 has a higher value than the anticipated 
value at t=0 of total debt at t=2. 
In chapter VI, I provide the main conclusions of the analysis. I outline some possible 
extension of the environment I have developed in this dissertation. In particular, I try to 
assess the shortcomings of the setup I developed, and outline some possible future 
improvements.  
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CHAPTER II 
EXOGENOUS LENDING 
II.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I present a version of my model assuming exogenous lending, for the 
purpose of comparability with Chang and Velasco (2000). In addition, this chapter 
provides a benchmark that I will use later, after I introduce endogenous lending 
explicitly. In the next chapters, introducing endogenous behavior for international 
lenders will be a first step before looking at the effect of date- and maturity-specific 
reserve requirements on private flows of borrowing.  
In the model described below, international lenders are exogenously willing to 
provide lending up to a certain limit. Chang and Velasco (2000) explain this exogenous 
credit limit as an assumption in tune with the literature on collateralized borrowing: in 
that literature, borrowing is constrained to the available amount of liquidity. However in 
Chang and Velasco (2000), liquidity is not modeled explicitly and the credit limit is 
exogenously imposed. In addition, if such credit constraint is binding, this usually 
implies the presence of credit rationing. Credit rationing refers to “situations where a 
borrower’s demand is unfulfilled, although he is willing to pay the ruling market price” 
(Baltensperger, 1978, pp.173). In this chapter, for comparability, a la Chang and Velasco 
(2000), international lending behavior is not explicitly modeled, and I impose upper 
limits on the borrowing by domestic borrowers.  
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II.2. The environment 
II.2.1. Domestic depositors and domestic banks 
The economy faces a two-period planning horizon with three dates: t=0, 1, and 2. In 
the domestic country, there is a continuum of agents with unit-mass. These agents are 
born at t=0. There is a single good each period, which is homogeneous across countries. 
This good cannot be produced: this is an endowment or pure exchange economy. At t=0 
each depositor gets an endowment of 0e  units of the good. I assume that at t=1 and t=2, 
they do not receive any endowments of goods1. At 0=t , depositors do not consume.  
The domestic agents whom I call depositors are ex-ante identical but they may be ex-
post different due to a preferences’ shock that is realized at t=1. The distribution of this 
shock is known at t=0, and it is i.i.d. across agents. A t=0 with probability )1,0(∈λ , the 
depositors could be impatient and derive utility only from consuming goods at t=1. With 
probability )1( λ− , they could be patient and would want to consume goods at t=2 only. 
Thus domestic depositors will not consume in both periods. The distribution is known 
ex-ante and is public information. However when the event is realized at t=1, each 
depositor’s type realization is private information. Unlike Aizenman and Turnovsky 
(2002), there is no aggregate uncertainty. The only uncertainty in the borrowing country 
is private. 
                                                 
1 With this assumption I avoid the complexity that may arise with different types of deposits while I am 
focusing on different types of debts. For instance, a depositor receiving a new endowment at t=1 would 
face the choice of whether or not to deposit her new endowment at the bank at t=1 and I rule out such a 
possibility. The assumption that the domestic depositors have no endowments at t=2 is just a normalization 
that is standard in the literature. 
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The good is perishable if not invested or consumed. There is an investment 
technology works as follows: one unit of the good invested at t=0 yields a real gross rate 
of return 1>R  at t=2, but produces only r  units of the good if liquidated earlier at t=1, 
where Rr <2 .2 Let k denote the amount of goods invested in this technology at t=0.3 
Because of the uncertainty and the ex-post heterogeneity, a bank or a coalition of 
depositors arises endogenously. Henceforth I will use the terms “domestic bank” and 
“borrower” interchangeably. As is standard in the literature, due to the preferences’ 
shock that depositors face, they may gain from acting jointly. In fact, each depositor 
faces a probability λ  of being of the impatient type at t=1. If she was to choose autarky 
and learns that she is impatient, liquidating the investment at t=1 with a lower return 
becomes unavoidable. Therefore, depositors find it optimal to form a bank that can 
provide some insurance. In this setup, banks arise endogenously4. Banks will offer 
contracts that maximize the domestic depositors expected utility inducing truth-telling 
self-selection. To fix ideas, I assume a logarithmic form of utility.5 Thus a domestic 
depositor’s expected utility is given by 
)ln()1()ln(),( 2121 ccccU λλ −+=                                                                          (2.1) 
                                                 
2 Note that a one unit of the good can be reinvested at t=1 yielding r units at t=2. 
3 In Chang and Velasco (2000), the borrower has the possibility to invest in an additional technology: 
“international reserves” tb  with gross return equal to one. Here I abstract from such a possibility. It is 
important to note that in my model when 1>r , the rate of return on the investment technology would be 
higher than “international reserves” technology. The investment in k  would therefore dominate the saving 
in “international reserves”. In fact Chang and Velasco (2000) assume 0=r . 
4 One could also think of the bank as a possible contracting scheme for agents, in which agents exchange 
contracts to hedge against uncertainty. 
5 Note that with the logarithmic function, the substitution effect dominates the income effect, improving 
greatly the tractability of the model. 
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where 1c  and 2c  are consumption quantities at t=1 and t=2 respectively. )ln(c  is twice 
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in its arguments and satisfies the Inada 
conditions.  
II.2.2. International borrowing 
All domestic agents deposit their endowments at the bank at t=0. In addition to 
receiving deposits in the amount 0e  at t=0, only banks can borrow from international 
lenders. At t=0, two types of international debt are available to banks: short-term and 
long-term. At t=1, banks can only borrow short-term. 01d is the short-term bond issued 
by the domestic bank at t=0 that matures at t=1, paying a gross real interest rate 01ρ . 
12d is the short-term bond issued by the domestic bank at t=1 that matures at t=2, paying 
a gross real interest rate 12ρ . Finally, 02d is the long-term bond issued by the domestic 
bank at t=0 that matures at t=2 paying a gross real interest rate 02ρ . ,, 0201 ρρ and 12ρ  
are exogenous.6 Note that in anticipation for what is coming in chapter IV, to introduce 
date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements, I need two distinct date-specific short-
term bonds. 
II.2.3. The domestic bank’s problem 
In this chapter, I assume that there are international lenders who are willing to lend to 
banks in the domestic country inelastically. However, as in Chang and Velasco (2000), I 
impose a borrowing constraint that works as a rule for credit rationing. The rule is as 
                                                 
6 Chang and Velasco (2000) assume 1120201 === ρρρ . 
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follows: the total principal of the different types of bonds for which the banks are liable 
at each date must not exceed a certain limit. Let 0f  and 1f denote the limits at t=0 and 
t=1, respectively. Therefore the domestic bank faces two borrowing constraints7: 
00201 fdd =+                                                                                                     (2.2) 
10212 fdd =+                                                                                                     (2.3) 
I will assume, for reasons that will become clearer later, that 01 ff ≥ . Notice that in 
Chang and Velasco (2000) 10 ff = . Banks have access to the same investment 
technology that depositors have. The bank will decide how much to invest long-term k  
at t=0 and how much to liquidate l  at t=1, given R  and r  as explained above. Therefore 
the budget constraints faced by the bank at 1,0=t and 2  are given by: 
02010 ddek ++≤                                                                                               (2.4) 
rlddc +≤+ 1201011 ρλ                                                                                        (2.5) 
)()1( 020212122 lkRddc −≤++− ρρλ                                                                         (2.6) 
In addition, the following incentive compatibility constraint needs to hold8: 
                                                 
7 In this case I assume that the borrowing constraints are binding, implying that credit is rationed. This is 
implicitly assumed in Chang and Velasco (2000). It means that banks could be willing to borrow arbitrarily 
large amounts, but they are not allowed to. 
8 In my model I allow domestic depositors to have access to investment technology even after the bank is 
formed. A patient depositor has therefore the option of concealing her type and withdrawing 1c units of t=1 
goods from the bank. After investing this withdrawal for one period, at t=2, she could consume 1rc units of 
the goods at t=2. If the patient depositor reveals her true type and waits until date t=2, she would consume 
2c units of t=2 goods. Therefore the patient depositor will have an incentive to reveal her type if and only 
if 12 rcc ≥ . In Chang and Velasco (2000), once the bank is formed, depositors are not allowed to have 
access to the investment technology. Since they have a storage technology, there the incentive 
compatibility constraint takes the form: 12 cc ≥ . 
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12 rcc ≥                                                                                                              (2.7) 
II.3. Equilibria 
The bank’s problem is to choose lkdddcc ,,,,,, 12020121  to maximize (2.1) subject to 
(2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7), taking as given the world real gross interest rates 
120201 ,, ρρρ  and the other parameters 0e , R  and r . In Appendix A, I explain how I solve 
this problem. Despite the fact that interest rates are exogenous, I assume that the 
following perfect arbitrage condition holds.9 
021201 ρρρ =                                                                                                       (2.8) 
I need this assumption so that I can later compare my results with the equilibria with 
endogenous lending. 
A competitive equilibrium is defined as a set of non-negative allocations 
}ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 02120121 dddlkcc  for the domestic bank such that the domestic bank’s problem is 
solved and (2.8) holds. Since I am looking at equilibria where the domestic bank is a net 
borrower in international markets, I dismiss cases where 002 <d , 012 <d  or 001 <d . 
 
Proposition 1. If there is no early liquidation in equilibrium, i.e. 0ˆ =l , then 12dˆ  is 
strictly positive. When there is no early liquidation, then
r
Rr ≤<ψ , where 
1
2
ˆ
ˆ
c
c≡ψ . 
                                                 
9 This is a version that can be comparable to “pure expectations theory (that) hypothesizes that 
11
11
1
1
2 +
−−− = tttt RERR , which results in Lucas-Tree type Model, when utility is linear in consumption or 
there is no uncertainty” (Sargent, 1987, pp.105). 
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The proof for proposition 1 is provided in appendix A. Note that ψλ
λ
−1  is the marginal 
rate of substitution between consumptions across two different states: 1-being impatient 
or 2-being patient. It is the ratio of the marginal utility of 1cˆ  over the marginal utility of 
2cˆ . It measures how much a depositor is willing to give up of state 2 (being patient) 
consumption for one more unit of state 1 (being impatient) consumption. Thus 
proposition 1 implies that this marginal rate of substitution must be bounded. The upper 
bound means that for a given λ , the expected consumption of impatient depositors 
cannot be very high so that there is no early liquidation. The lower bound indicates that 
the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. This is assumed when there is no 
crisis at t=1. In this environment, there exist three types of equilibria, which may coexist 
or may exist uniquely depending on the parameter values. In anticipation of what will 
come in the sections where I describe each type of equilibria, let me set 
)(
)1(
00
002112
fe
ffA +
−−≡ λ
ρλρ                                                                                   (2.9) 
)(
)(
00
01202112
fe
ffB +
−+≡ λ
ρλρρ                                                                             (2.10) 
)(
)1(
00
002102
fe
ffC +
−−≡ λ
ρλρ                                                                                   (2.11) 
Note that CBA >> , when 1202 ρρ <  and CBA << , when 1202 ρρ > . Moreover, 
notice that BA ≠  when 101 ≠ρ . Below, I describe each one of the equilibria.  
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II.3.1. The interior solution 
An interior solution means that the first order conditions with respect to 01d , 02d  and 
12d  are zero. In this particular case 001 ≥d  , 002 ≥d , 012 >d . This is not a world general 
equilibrium analysis since the interest rates are exogenous by assumption. In this case the 
solution for the endogenous variables is: 
00
ˆ fek +=                                                                                                     (2.12) 
})({
)1(
1ˆ
12
11200100
01
02 ρ
ρρλ
ρ
fffeRd −++−=                                                  (2.13) 
)(
)()(ˆ
1202
0011201202
01 ρρ
λρρλρ
−
+−+−= feRffd                                                           (2.14) 
1202
00200021
12
)1()(ˆ ρρ
ρλλρ
−
−−+−= ffeRfd                                                                       (2.15) 
0
ˆ)1(ˆ 020100111 >−−−= λ
ρρ dffc                                                                    (2.16) 
0
1
ˆ)()(ˆ 021202112002 >−
−−−+= λ
ρρρ dffeRc                                                     (2.17) 
 
Proposition 2. Under the perfect arbitrage condition, there exists an equilibrium with an 
interior solution 001 ≥d  , 002 ≥d , 012 >d  if and only if 
(i) RA ≤  and BR ≤  when  101 >ρ  or 0212 ρρ <  
(ii) RA ≥  and RB ≥  when  101 <ρ  or 0212 ρρ >  
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Proof. 
Under the perfect arbitrage condition 021201 ρρρ = , it must be the case that 101 >ρ  if 
0212 ρρ < . I will first prove (i). Note that if 0212 ρρ < , BA < , and if 0212 ρρ > , BA > . 
Moreover if 0212 ρρ < , BC < , and if 0212 ρρ > , BC > . First suppose that 1202 ρρ > . If 
0212 ρρ <  or 101 >ρ , using equation (2.13), for 002 ≥d , it must be that AR ≥ . This 
means that for the domestic bank to hold positive amounts of long-term bonds at 0=t , 
the gross return on investment at 2=t  must be high. In addition, if 0212 ρρ <  or 101 >ρ , 
using equation (2.14), for 001 ≥d , it must be that BR ≤ . It means that for the domestic 
bank to hold positive amounts of short-term bonds at 0=t , the gross return on 
investment at 2=t  must be high. The upper and lower bounds are consistent 
when 0212 ρρ <  or 101 >ρ . Using equation (2.14) for 012 >d , it must be CR < . Thus 
when 101 >ρ , the interior solution exists if and only if  CBRA <≤≤ .10 Now I turn to 
prove (ii): suppose that 101 <ρ , for 002 ≥d  AR ≤ , 001 >d , BR ≥ , and for 012 >d , 
CR > . When 0212 ρρ >  and 101 <ρ  the reverse applies, the interior solution exists if 
and only if ARBC ≤≤< .□ 
                                                 
10 For strict interior solution, the inequalities on the bounds for R  become strict inequalities.  
 26
II.3.2. The domestic bank is willing to borrow only long term debt at t=0 
In this equilibrium, 002ˆ fd = , which entails 0ˆ01 =d and 0ˆ 0112 >−= ffd .11 For this 
equilibrium to exist, it must be that AR ≥ . The latter condition entails that when R , the 
gross return on investment at 2=t  is very high, the domestic borrower would prefer to 
borrow only long-term. This is because the liquidation cost at t=1 becomes relatively 
higher when R  is very high. In this equilibrium, the consumptions allocation would be: 
λ
01
1ˆ
ffc −=                                                                                                   (2.18) 
)1(
)()(ˆ 00212112002 λ
ρρρ
−
−+−+= fffeRc                                                       (2.19) 
In (2.18), 01 ff >  is needed to ensure non-negative consumption at t=1. Notice that 
unlike the interior solution, in this equilibrium, the condition AR ≥  does not require 
1ˆ01 >ρ  or 1202 ˆˆ ρρ > . Thus in this environment when the opportunity cost of liquidating 
at t=1 is high enough, an equilibrium with only long-term borrowing at t=0, will arise.  
II.3.3. The domestic bank is not willing to borrow long-term at t=0 
In this equilibrium, 0ˆ02 =d , implying 001ˆ fd =  and 112ˆ fd = . Again in anticipation for 
what is coming in chapter IV, to introduce date- and maturity- specific reserve 
requirements, I need two distinct date-specific short-term bonds. Note though that the 
setup with exogenous lending does not allow for such an interesting analysis. For 
instance in this equilibrium, it is not possible to generate high short-term borrowing in 
                                                 
11 Notice that when 
01 ff = , as in Chang and Velasco (2000), this is not an equilibrium with banks 
because having 01201 === ldd , entails 01 =c , yielding a utility well below the utility under autarky.  
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one period without generating high short-term debt in the other. This is because credit is 
rationed and once one of the short-term bonds is at the limit, then 002 =d , which means 
that the other short-term bond would have to go to the limit too. When 0ˆ02 =d , the 
consumptions at t=1 and t=2 become respectively: 
λ
ρ 0011
1ˆ
ffc −=                                                                                                  (2.20) 
λ
ρ
−
−+=
1
ˆ 112002
fRfeRc                                                                                      (2.21) 
Note that for 01 >c and 02 >c , it must be the case that 00011 >− ff ρ  and 
1
00
12
)(
f
feR +<ρ . In other words, 12ρ  should be relatively low, so that there is a high 
demand for the second period short-term debt 12d . BR ≤  is a necessary condition for 
this equilibrium to exist. Thus when the return on investment at t=2 is low, the relative 
opportunity cost of liquidation at t=1 is low and short-term debt is preferred to long-term 
debt. Unlike the condition at the interior solution, the existence of this equilibrium does 
not require 101 >ρ . If 101 <ρ , short-term debt at t=0 is relatively cheap and it is obvious 
why this equilibrium may arise when BR ≤ . When 101 >ρ , short-term debt seems 
relatively expensive: it may not be obvious why this equilibrium may arise when there is 
low return on investment BR ≤  if the short-term debt is costly. Note that when 101 >ρ , 
with the perfect arbitrage condition, I get that 1202 ρρ > . Thus both the short-term debt 
and the long-term seem relatively expensive. The choice of borrowing only for short-
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term in this equilibrium comes from the fact that the opportunity cost of liquidation is 
relatively low. 
II.3.4 Multiplicity of equilibria 
From the above analysis, one can summarize the conditions under which multiple 
equilibria may be observed. As mentioned the value for R  relative to a combination of 
parameters determines the scope for existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria 
Figure 2.1 shows the possibility of existence of the three types of equilibria. In addition 
for existence, the non-negativity constraint of consumptions and the incentive 
compatibility constraints must be checked. Again the focus is on equilibria with non- 
negative amount of all bonds. As I mentioned earlier, this is because I am focusing on 
external borrowing. In the construction of figure 2.1, it is assumed that the perfect 
arbitrage condition holds and 01 ff > .  
Two assumptions on the parameters are worthwhile discussing simultaneously: (i) 
01 ff >  for all sets and (ii) whether 0212 ρρ <  or 0212 ρρ > . The assumption 01 ff >  is 
crucial for cases 3.2 and 3.3. This is consistent with the fact that at 1=t , there is a need 
for liquidity and therefore a higher credit limit is needed. When 0212 ρρ <  is assumed, a 
relatively low interest rate for the second short term debt implies that it would not be 
costly to get the new financing at t=1. The concurrence of the two assumptions 01 ff >  
and 0212 ρρ <  implies the existence of multiple equilibria when BRA ≤≤ . In this case 
it is not clear whether new financing will be higher because of higher 1f , or because of 
low 12ρ . This raises the question of what is exactly causing credit to be rationed in this 
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setup at 1=t .12 However when 0212 ρρ > , or 101 <ρ , there are only unique equilibria. 
The type of each equilibrium is dependent on the range of R  in relation with other 
parameters. For ARB ≤≤ , both the short-term debt and the long-term debt at t=0 are 
relatively cheap leading the interior solution to exist uniquely. For all 01ρ , for low R , 
the opportunity cost of liquidating early is low, so at 0=t , only short-term debt is 
chosen. For high R , the opportunity cost of liquidating early is high, so at 0=t , only long 
term-debt is chosen. In the next section I show some numerical example to illustrate the 
existence of the different types of equilibria. 
 
 
Range for unique and multiple equilibria
 
Unique corner with only 
long-term debt at t=0  (3.2) 
Unique corner with short-
term debt only  (3.3) 
Unique corner with only 
long-term debt at t=0  (3.2) Unique Interior (3.1) 
                                     
Unique corner with short-
term debt only  (3.3) 
Multiple Equilibria:All three 
cases 3.1, 3.2, 33 are possible
AB
11200102 ,,0 fdfdd === 0112101102 ,0, ffddfd −===
11200102 ,,0 fdfdd === 0112101102 ,0, ffddfd −===
101 >ρ
101<ρ
AR < RB <
BR < RA <
A B
ARB ≤≤
BRA ≤≤
 
 
Fig.2.1. Ranges for unique and multiple equilibria 
 
                                                 
12 See Baltensperger (1978) for a survey on different types of credit rationing.  
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II.4. Numerical examples from simulation  
In this section I present a numerical example from simulating the above presented 
model with exogenous lending. This part is intended for illustration purpose of the 
various analytical results I have derived. I use the following parameter space: 
01
02
120201100 ,5.1,75.1,10000,5000,2000 ρ
ρρρρ ====== ffe . 
 
 
Table 2.1. Bounds A and B  
λ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
A 2.602 1.8367 1.5816 1.4541 1.3776 1.3265 1.2901 1.2628 1.2415
B 7.1939 4.1327 3.1122 2.602 2.2959 2.0918 1.9461 1.8367 1.7517  
with 5.1,75.1,10000,5000,2000 0201100 ===== ρρffe  
 
 
I illustrate the case when 1202 ρρ > . For the other case, simulation results can be 
presented upon request. Table 2.1 shows that both bounds for R  displayed in figure 2.1 
decreases with λ . Note that this result is not specific to 1202 ρρ > . Equilibria that have 
negative holdings of debt are ruled out. To illustrate multiplicity or uniqueness for 
different values of R , I fix 3.0=λ  and vary R . For the pair )5.1,3.0(),( =Rλ , there may 
exist a unique equilibrium with non-negative borrowing where 500001 =d , 002 =d , 
1000012 =d , 41671 =c , 75522 =c , 0.66
1
2 =
c
c . When 7.0=r , this equilibrium does not 
exist because the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied. When 5.0=r , this 
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equilibrium exists uniquely. This unique equilibrium is a corner with only short-term 
borrowing at t=0, and no long-term borrowing. For the pair )6.2,3.0(),( =Rλ , the three 
types of equilibria may exist. Accordingly, }86.0,55.0,3.3{
ˆ
ˆ
1
2 =
c
c
are the respective 
consumption ratios for each case (3.3), (3.2), (3.1). For example, when 5.0=r , the three 
types of equilibria exist with non-negative borrowing. For the pair )2.3,3.0(),( =Rλ , a 
unique equilibrium exists with only long-term borrowing at t=0. There 91.0
ˆ
ˆ
1
2 =
c
c
, thus 
this equilibrium would exist when 9.0=r  but not for 1=r .1.  
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Fig.2.2. Utility of domestic agents across different types of equilibria 
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Now I turn to analyze how utility changes across the different sets of equilibria: 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3. Suppose 5.0=r , all cases illustrated in figure 2.1,with 101 >ρ , exist. 
Figure 2.2 shows the expected utility of domestic agents at t=0 for 3.0=λ . Note that for 
low (high) R , the utility at the equilibrium with only short-term borrowing (case 3.3) is 
higher (lower) than the equilibrium with only long-term borrowing at t=0 (case 3.2). For 
all ranges of R , the equilibrium with an interior solution described in case 3.1, has the 
highest utility of all the three types of equilibria. This pattern is not specific to 3.0=λ . 
II.5. Conclusion 
I would like to highlight three issues. First, when I allow for an environment with a 
rich maturity structure, the scope for multiple equilibria that are locally unique increases 
even when credit is rationed. I have also shown that the scope of multiple equilibria and 
the ranking of utility across different type of equilibria depend on the opportunity cost of 
liquidation. Second with exogenous lending, it is impossible to generate equilibria with 
high demand for one of the short-term bonds without generating high demand for the 
other short-term bonds. Third, credit rationing is exogenous when I impose credit limits 
in (2.2) and (2.3). For all three issues, it is important to consider international lenders 
behavior explicitly before I look at the effect of reserve requirements on the composition 
of debt. In the next chapter I turn to the model with an endogenous lending behavior. 
 33
CHAPTER III 
ENDOGENOUS LENDING 
III.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I extend the model presented in chapter II to endogenize international 
lenders’ behavior. For the purpose of the analysis, the world consists of two blocks: the 
high-income block and the low-income block. I assume that the high-income block is the 
rest of the world, and the domestic economy-which is a large open-economy- is the low-
income block. In the high-income block, the international creditors are homogeneous. 
The low-income block corresponds to the domestic economy described in chapter II. 
Unlike Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002), in both economies, there is no aggregate 
uncertainty. The only uncertainty in the low income block is private. Both blocks are 
endowment (pure exchange) economies. In this chapter I assume that all agents do not 
expect a crisis to be possible and that they behave accordingly.  
III.2. The environment with endogenous behaviors of international lenders  
III.2.1. The domestic bank problem 
The domestic bank and domestic depositors face a similar environment described in 
the chapter with exogenous lending. In particular, unlike Chang and Velasco (2000), I do 
not impose credit limits, since quantities and prices will be determined in equilibrium 
once the lenders’ problem is considered explicitly. The domestic bank’s problem is to 
choose },,,,,,{ 12020121 lkdddcc  to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2),(2.3), (2.4) and 
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(2.7) given the endowment 0e  at t=0, the investment technology rate of return R , the 
costly liquidation return r  and the world real gross interest rates ddd 120201 ,, ρρρ .13 Notice 
that 1201, dd  and 02d  denote quantities demanded of each bond. 
III.2.2. The lenders’ problem  
There is a continuum of international lenders with unit-mass. Unlike agents in the 
borrowing block, the agents in the lending block are ex-ante and ex-post homogeneous. 
They derive utility from consuming goods at both t=1 and t=2. Let *1c  denote a 
representative lender’s consumption of goods at t=1 and *2c be her consumption at t=2. 
Again for simplicity, I assume a logarithmic utility function. The representative lender’s 
utility is 14 
)ln()ln( *2
**
1
* ccU β+=                                                                                (3.1) 
where *β , the discount factor is identical across lenders. Each international lender 
receives endowments of goods in the amounts *1
*
0 , ee  and 
*
2e at t=0, t=1 and t=2 
respectively. For simplicity, I assume that her only investment opportunity is lending to 
the low-income block through the domestic banks in the amounts of 1201, ss  and 02s . 
01s is the short-term loan to the domestic bank at t=0 and maturing at t=1, with a gross 
real interest rate of s01ρ . 12s is the short-term loan to the domestic bank  at t=1 and 
                                                 
13 Refer to Appendix B. 
14 For simplicity, *U is assumed to be additively separable. Also note that the lender maximizes her 
lifetime utility, whereas the borrower maximizes its expected lifetime utility across two contingent states 
(patience and impatience.)  
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maturing at t=2 with a gross real interest rate of s12ρ . 02s is the long-term loan to the 
domestic bank at t=0 and maturing at t=2 with a gross real interest rate of s02ρ . Notice 
that 021201 ,, sss  denote the quantity supplied of each loan. The budget constraints by a 
typical international lender are:  
*
00201 ess ≤+                                                                                                    (3.2) 
0101
*
112
*
1 sesc
sρ+≤+                                                                                        (3.3) 
12120202
*
2
*
2 ssec
ss ρρ ++≤                                                                               (3.4) 
The international lender’s problem is therefore to choose 120201
*
2
*
1 ,,,, ssscc  to 
maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) taking as given the endowments 
*
1
*
0 , ee ,
*
2e and the world interest rates
sss
120201 ,, ρρρ . In appendix B I derive the relevant 
first order conditions. A summary of the players and market clearance is illustrated in 
figure 3.1. 
III.3. Equilibria  
In this economy, a competitive equilibrium is a set of interest rates }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 021201 ρρρ , a 
set of international bonds’ allocations }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 021201 qqq , a set of allocations for the typical 
domestic bank },,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 02120121 dddcck  and a set of allocations for the typical 
international lender },,,ˆ,ˆ{ 0212012
*
1 ssscc  given },,,,,{ *
*
2
*
1
*
00 βλeeee  and the reserve 
requirements rates },,{ 021201 θθθ  such that:  
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i. },,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 02120121 dddcck  solve the domestic bank problem of maximizing (2.1) 
subject to (2.2), (2.3) (2.4) and (2.7).  
ii. },,,ˆ,ˆ{ 0212012
*
1 ssscc  solve the international lender problem of maximizing (3.1) 
subject to (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). 
iii. Markets clear  
 
 
 
 
Fig.3.1. Structure of the model 
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The equilibrium short-term interest rate sd 010101ˆ ρρρ ==  clears the market for the first 
short-term debt so that:  
010101 qˆds ==                                                                                                  (3.5) 
The equilibrium long-term interest rate sd 020202ˆ ρρρ ==  clears the market for the long-
term debt so that:  
020202 qˆds ==                                                                                                 (3.6) 
The equilibrium short-term interest rate sd 121212ˆ ρρρ ==  clears the market for the 
second short-term debt so that:  
121212 qˆds ==                                                                                                 (3.7) 
III.3.1. On multiplicity and indeterminacy of equilibria 
Thus in the world general equilibrium, the interest rates will be such that markets 
clear. Accordingly, the equilibrium term structure of the debt will be determined. The 
difficulty with this type of model is that the results are in general characterized by 
multiple equilibria. In addition, sometimes within each set of multiple equilibria, there is 
a tendency to find indeterminacy. Indeterminacy raises several concerns and problems. In 
fact equilibria that are indeterminate might be Pareto efficient or not [Kehoe and Levine 
(1990).] Theoretically, due to indeterminacy the task of fully ranking these equilibria 
becomes arduous.15 Empirically, multiple equilibria explain why economies with similar 
characteristics and parameters of their economic environments, face differently similar 
                                                 
15 Kehoe and Levine (1990) provide a thorough survey of intertemporal models with general equilibrium 
that have indeterminacy.  
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shocks. This can be exemplified by different reaction to crises despite comparable 
economic environments. Nevertheless, aside from the theoretical problem of Pareto 
ranking these equilibria, an empirical problem arises in such setups: how to set policy 
recommendation or fix a problem in an economy, if it is indeterminate where the 
economy is. This might explain perhaps why some policy recommendations have failed 
their purposes.  
Relative prices are eventually what matters for theoretical analysis. As long as 
relative prices are determined, none of the problems raised above exist. Borrowing from 
Mas-Collell et. al.’s definition of Walrasian equilibrium, if I normalize one of the interest 
rates, a normalized price vector 


01
02
01
12 , ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ  constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium if and 
only if it solves a system with 2 equations in 2 unknowns
01
02
01
12 , ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
 such that the vector 
of excess demand is equal to zero, i.e. the market clearing conditions are satisfied. Mas-
Collell et al. introduce the concept of regularity to characterize such equilibrium:  
An equilibrium price vector ),....,( 11 −= Lppp to be regular if the 
)1()1( −×− LL  matrix of price effects )(ˆ pzD  is nonsingular, that is has 
rank )1( −L . If every normalized equilibrium price vector is regular, I say 
that the economy is regular(…) Any regular (normalized) equilibrium 
price vector is locally isolated (or locally unique). That is there is an 
0>ε such that if pp =' , 1' == LL pp and ε<− ||'|| pp , then 0)'( ≠pz . 
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Moreover if the economy is regular then the number of normalized 
equilibrium vector is finite. (Mas-Collell et al., 1995, pp.591) 
Such a concept is helpful for characterizing local uniqueness. Using the concept of 
regularity or relative price determinacy allows me to compare different sets of equilibria, 
and to draw some comparative conclusions on the effect of imposing reserve 
requirements in such a model in the next chapter. 
III.3.2. Description of equilibria 
There exist 3 types of possible equilibria where 0ˆ01 ≥q  0ˆ12 ≥q  0ˆ02 ≥q  and the 
perfect arbitrage (2.8) condition holds.9 Such a condition spans the relationship among 
the three interest rates as a sheet in the three dimensional space. Figure 3.2 displays this 
relationship. 
I classify the three sets of equilibria according to the general behavior of the agents in 
the world economy: In set (a), the borrowing banks and the international lenders are at an 
interior solution. In set (b) the borrowing banks are at their interior solution but 
international lenders are willing to lend as much as possible. In set (c) The international 
lenders are at an interior solution but the banks are willing to borrow as much as 
possible. Before I proceed into explaining the cases, it is important to compare the 
general result with that of Chang and Velasco. Note that because of exogenous lending 
behavior, set (c) cannot arise along with 021201 ρρρ =  in Chang and Velasco (2000). I will 
show that set (c) is the most problematic because it exhibits a case of equilibrium with 
price irregularity. Note that the following always holds in equilibrium: 
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*
00
ˆ eek +=                                                                                                        (3.8) 
where kˆ  is the equilibrium investment in the illiquid technology at t=0. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3.2. The perfect arbitrage condition 
 
 
Set (a): This is what I call the standard case. Both the demands of the borrowers and 
supply of lenders are interior. Thus the first order conditions for both the borrower and 
the lender are equal to zero. Here the arbitrage condition (2.8) is derived from both the 
lender and borrower problems. This is a locally unique equilibrium point: The interest 
rates are functions of endowments and other parameters in the world economy: 
The interest rates: 
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*
0
*
2
*
0
*
1
*
01 )1(
ˆ
eReeR
eR
+++= βλ
βρ                                                                      (3.9) 
*
1
*
*
0
*
2
*
0
12
)1(ˆ
e
eReeR
β
βλρ +++=                                                                    (3.10) 
R=02ρˆ                                                                                                           (3.11) 
The above equilibrium has determinate and locally unique interest rates. Because of the 
perfect arbitrage condition, the quantities of debt are not determined: there are 2 
equations with 3 unknown.  
*
00201 ˆˆ eqq =+                                                                                                  (3.12) 
12
0
010112 ˆ
ˆˆˆ ρ
λρ eRqq +=                                                                                      (3.13) 
Note that the net new lending at t=1 }ˆˆˆ{ 010112 qq ρ−  and the total debt at t=0 are 
determined. The ranges for the first short-term debt, the second short-term and the long-
term debt are ],0[ˆ *001 eq ∈ , )]ˆˆ(,ˆ[ˆ 001*00100112 eeeq ρλρρλ +∈ , and ],0[ˆ *002 eq ∈  
respectively. In this case all kcccc ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ *2
*
121 have a unique solution
16. Note that 
                                                 
16At the unique point,  the depositors consumptions are: 
)1(
ˆ
*
0
*
2
*
0
*
1
*
0
1 βλ
β
+++= eReeR
eeRc , 02ˆ eRc =  
The international lenders consumptions are: ]
)1(
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considering the incentive compatibility constraint in (2.7), a sufficient condition for the 
interior solution not to exist is aeere
reR B≡++−< ])1([ *00**1*
*
2
βλβ . 
Set (b): Only the borrower is at the interior solution and the lender is willing to lend 
as much as possible. Here the arbitrage condition is derived from the fact that the 
borrower is at the interior solution, but not the lender. The long-run interest rate is equal 
to the long-run investment return rate R=02ρˆ , showing that the borrower is within the 
interior solution. For the borrower 001 ≥d , 012 ≥d  and 002 ≥d . The lender however 
would like to lend as much as possible. In this case for the lender, 001 =s , *002 es =  
and ∞→12s . At equilibrium only the interest rate for the short-term debt that is issued at 
t=1, would be high enough, i.e. higher than the consumption inter-temporal marginal rate 
of substitution which is *
1
*
*
2*
c
c
βψ ≡  so that 
s
12
* ρψ <  , s
s
01
02*
ρ
ρψ < . Only if the interest 
rate is high enough would the lender be willing to lend as much as possible at t=1. Note 
that in this case the lender will not lend short at t=0. One might wonder why not the 
opposite scenario happens, i.e. why not lend only short i.e. *001 es = . The reason is that 
for the perfect arbitrage condition to hold, when 12ρ  is very high, then 02ρ  is also high. 
Correspondingly the equilibrium quantities are given by: 
0ˆ01 =q                                                                                                             (3.14) 
*
002ˆ eq =                                                                                                           (3.15) 
00112 ˆˆ eq ρλ=                                                                                                     (3.16) 
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0011 ˆˆ ec ρ=                                                                                                         (3.17) 
02ˆ eRc =                                                                                                          (3.18) 
001
*
1
*
1 ˆˆ eec ρλ−=                                                                                         (3.19) 
0
*
0
*
2
*
2 eReRec λ++=                                                                                      (3.20) 
Note that this system is regular. If 1ˆ01 =ρ , i.e. normalized, then R== 1202 ˆˆ ρρ , there 
exists an equilibrium such that 0ˆ01 =d , *002ˆ ed =  and 012ˆ ed λ= . Note that in terms of 
representation in the three-interest-rate space, this is a line on the sheet built by the 
perfect arbitrage condition. For this equilibrium to exist, the condition 12*
1
*
*
2 ρˆβ <c
c  
should hold. The latter condition doesn’t hold if beee
eR B≡+−−≤ 0**0*1*
*
2
)1( λββ . 
Set (c): Only the lender is at an interior solution but borrowers are willing to 
borrow as much as possible. (Each case depending on each asset): This case is 
characterized by the following condition:17  
R<= 021201 ρρρ                                                                                             (3.21) 
 The perfect arbitrage condition comes from the lender side. In this case any borrowing 
seems to be cheap enough and therefore, the borrower would like to borrow as much as 
possible. In the cases (c.1) and (c.2), the borrower demands as much as possible of only 
one of the short-term bonds and as much as possible of the long-term bond. 
                                                 
17 Note that none of the equilibria in sets (a), (b) and (c) has R>02ρˆ . This is so because if the long-term 
interest rate is higher that the gross return on investment, along with the perfect arbitrage condition, it 
would be beyond the borrower capacity to pay back the debt.  
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Case (c.1): At t=0 the borrower would like to borrow short-term within her interior set 
001 ≥d , but would like to borrow as much as possible long term ∞→02d . Knowing 
that the bank is playing in a large open economy, her  high demand for long term debt 
would drive up the long-term interest rate and thus by the arbitrage condition, would 
increase the short-run interest rates. Therefore, the bank would like to make sure it will 
be able to pay back her first short-term debt, by rolling over the debt, and asking to 
borrow as much as possible at t=1, ∞→12d . On the other hand, the lender would like to 
limit its lending to an interior solution which bounds the high willingness of the borrower 
to borrow: Note that this is due to the fact that the gross interest rates are relatively low, 
but not too low to cut the market. In this case at equilibrium the sheet in the three 
dimensional space, described by the perfect arbitrage condition, has a bound such that 
R<02ρˆ , r≥01ρˆ  and r<12ρˆ . The latter conditions are necessary for this equilibrium to 
exist: they show that the interest rate on the long-term debt and the second short-term 
debt would be relatively cheap, so that the demand of the bank for these bonds is very 
high. Notice that r≥01ρˆ  indicates that the demand for 01d  is interior. After markets 
clear, one can get the following two equalities from the bank demand for bonds and the 
supply of international lenders respectively: 
])([
)1(
ˆˆˆ *0020
02
010112 eReRR
qq ρλρλ
λρ −++−=−                                         (3.22) 
)1(ˆ
ˆˆˆˆˆ *
12
*
002
*
2
*
112
*
010112 βρ
ρρβρ +
−−=− eeeqq                                                                 (3.23) 
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In addition for 0ˆ1 >c  and 0ˆ2 >c , it must be that 010112 ˆˆ qq ρ>  
or 0ˆˆ *002
*
2
*
112
* >−− eee ρρβ . In other words if 01ρˆ  is normalized to 1, or 0212 ˆˆ ρρ = , it is 
possible to get a normalized lower bound for 12ρˆ or 02ρˆ : 
1202*
0
*
1
*
*
2 ˆˆ ρρβ =<+ ee
e                                                                                    (3.24) 
The lower bound for 12ρˆ  reflects the supply side unwilling to buy the second short-term 
bond (or help a roll-over) at very low 12ρˆ . 
From (3.22) and (3.23), after equating the right-hand side, I get a non-linear equation 
with 12ρ  and 02ρ . When 01ρˆ  is normalized to 1, and when using the perfect arbitrage 
condition, one gets 0212 ˆˆ ρρ = . There the polynomial would have the following form:  
0ˆˆ 02
2
02 =++ cba ρρ                                                                                         (3.25) 
where )( *1
*
0
* eea += λβ , )}()1()1)({( *00**2*0*1* eeReReeb ++−−−−= λβλλβ  
and Rec )1(*2 λ−−= . Here there is relative price determinacy. There are two equations 
with three unknown: the system is regular. However one of the equations is non-linear. 
Since 0<ac , and since 0>a , there is one root that is positive and one that is negative 
for (3.25). Therefore there is only one interest rate to solve (3.26). The normalized 
system with 1ˆ01 =ρ has the interest rates a
acbb
2
4ˆˆ
2
0212
−+−== ρρ . To compare with 
the case were the lender was not at the interior solution, but the borrower was bound to 
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the interior solution, there the outcome was also a regular set. A sufficient condition for 
this equilibrium not to exist from (3.21) and (3.24) is that 1*
01
*
*
2
cee
eR B=−< β . 
Case (c.2): At t=0, the borrower would like to borrow as much as possible of the first 
short-term bond ∞→01d  and the long-term bond ∞→02d because both interest rates 
are relatively cheap. In this case, the conditions (3.21), 
r
Rr <<01ρˆ  and r≥12ρˆ  hold. 
r≥12ρˆ  indicates that the demand for the second short-term borrowing is interior. Since 
all cases in set (c), the typical international lender is at the interior solution in the supply 
of all types of loans, equation (3.23) holds in this case (c.2). When markets clear, one get 
the following equation from the demand side: 


 −=− *0010
12
010112 ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ eeRqq ρρλρ                                                                     (3.26) 
One gets the following relation between 02ρˆ and 12ρˆ  so that  
)1)1((
ˆ)1)((ˆ
**
0
12
*
1
**
2
**
00
02 −+
−+++= βλ
ρββλρ
e
eeeeR                                                    (3.27) 
This is a regular equilibrium; the first order conditions of the lender provide the perfect 
arbitrage condition. There are two equations with 3 unknown interest rates.  If I 
normalize 1ˆ01 =ρ , the perfect arbitrage condition entails 1202 ˆˆ ρρ = . Using (3.26) and 
(3.23), I find that equilibrium interest rates are such that: 
*
1
***
0
*
2
**
00
0212 )1)1((
)1)((ˆˆ
ee
eeeR
ββλ
βλρρ +−+
+++==                                                           (3.28) 
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For consistency with R<02ρˆ , using (3.28), the following condition should hold for the 
normalized system 2*
0
*
0
*
1
*
*
2
)1( ceee
eR B≡−+−> βλβ . A sufficient condition for this 
equilibrium not to exist is 2cR B≤ . To derive the latter condition, I assume 
0)1)1(( *1
***
0 >+−+ ee ββλ . In case (c.2), when ∞→01d  and 012 ≥d , the normalized 
system has a one relative price determinate equilibrium. 02ρˆ  is a linear function of 12ρˆ . 
(3.28) indicates that there is a monotonic relation between the interest rate on long-term 
debt and that born on the first short-term debt: if 1)1( * >+ βλ , there is a negative 
relation. If 1)1( * <+ βλ , there is a positive relation. The intuition is that if domestic 
depositors are sufficiently impatient, a higher 12ρˆ  would lead to a lower 02ρˆ  implying 
that 12d  and 02d  are indirectly substitutes for the domestic bank. Since at equilibrium 
*
00201 ˆˆ eqq =+ , a lower 02ρˆ  means that the borrower will demand more of the long-term 
bond, but this means that in equilibrium she will demand less of the short-term bond. 
Thus a higher 12ρˆ  would lead to a lower 01qˆ . Accordingly for low λ , in this equilibrium, 
the relation between 12d  and 01d  becomes like a relation between complements. 
Similarly for high λ , in this equilibrium the relation between 12d  and 01d  become like 
the relation between substitutes. I would like here to introduce the reader to the special 
feature of this model in anticipation of the chapter with crisis (chapter V).The new 
lending at t=1 will be complementary to 01d  if λ  is very low, because the possibility of 
the effect of the run by the )1( λ−  potential runners will be low.  
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Case (c.3): The borrower is willing to borrow as much as possible, using all types of 
bonds: ∞→01d ∞→02d and ∞→12d .  
 
Proposition 3: For the normalized 1ˆ01 =ρ , a sufficient condition for the irregular 
equilibrium (c.3) not to exist is 3*
0
*
2
)1( ce
eR B≡+< βλ .  
 
Proof. 
Given the borrower’s budget constraints, this cannot be the case unless there is some 
trade off between 01d and 12d  which explains the bounds on 12d . From the borrower side, 
EqqD <−< 010112 ˆˆˆ ρ                                                                                        (3.29) 
where
02
*
002001
ˆ)1(
])ˆ([ˆ
ρλλ
ρρλ
+−
−+≡
R
eReRD  and 
12
0
*
002 )ˆ(
ρ
λρλ eReRE +−≡ .  
The lender is at its interior solution so that 
)1(11
ˆˆˆ *
12
*
2
*
*
001*
1*
*
010112 βρβ
ρ
β
βρ +++++=−≡
eeeqqF                                      (3.30) 
Using (3.29) and (3.30), it must be that EFD << . From EF < , with 1ˆ01 =ρ , one can 
derive an upper bound for 12ρˆ : 
)1(
)1(ˆ
*
0
*
0
*
1
*
*
2
*
0
12 βλβ
βλρ +++
−+<
eee
eeR                                                                       (3.31) 
Since 0ˆ12 >ρ  must hold, the equilibrium would not exist when the upper bound in (3.31) 
is negative. 
 49
What does proposition 3 mean? If
0
*
2* )1(
eR
e<+ βλ , an equilibrium with ∞→01d  
∞→02d  and ∞→12d  would not exist. In this case, if λ  is sufficiently low, there is no 
market equilibrium 12ρˆ that is low enough for the demand for 12d  to be high enough. 
The intuition is as follows: 02d is very high. At 2=t , 0202dρ  will be paid back to 
international lenders. In addition, at 2=t , 2)1( cλ−  goods will be paid by the bank to 
patient depositors. If a new borrowing at 1=t  is made, then an additional payment of 
1212dρ  should be made to lenders. When )1( λ−  is high, this would exceed at 2=t  the 
capacity of the bank to pay back all domestic depositors and international lenders claim. 
Recall that all (c) cases satisfy (2.8). Although the bank is willing to borrow as 
much as possible, in general equilibrium these bonds have an upper bound. In the last of 
these three cases there is indeterminacy but the first two exhibit regularity. Unlike the 
case with exogenous lending, under the perfect arbitrage condition, equilibria with 
excessive demand for either of the short-term bonds separately arise with endogenous 
lending (see case c.1 and c.2). In general equilibrium, the interest rates are not 
exogenous: there will be low enough interest rates that clear the market and that are 
associated with an excessive quantity demanded of the short-term bonds. Intuitively, 
since it is a general equilibrium analysis, the total international lending in each period 
will not only depend on the bonds sold at that period but also on the sale of other bonds 
in other periods. Case (b) is the case where the borrower is in its interior solution set, 
therefore along with (2.8), the long-term interest rate is such that R=02ρ . The existence 
of 2 equations with 3 prices renders such a set of indeterminate equilibria what is called a 
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regular equilibrium. Note that case (a), the locally unique point in interest rates but not in 
quantities, and case (b) the locally regular equilibrium has the bank behaving within the 
interior solution i.e. not willing to borrow as much as possible of any asset.  
 
 
 
Fig.3.3. Range for multiple equilibria (i) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 is constructed based on the derivation in section III.3.2 and serves only for 
illustration purpose. To construct figure 3.2 I assume that the conditions 
*
0
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1
**
2 eee −> β and *0*1* ee >β hold.  Note that I use the word possible when I talk 
about existence. The reason is that in section III.3.2 I derive only sufficient conditions 
for non-existence. There are more conditions to guarantee existence such as the incentive 
compatibility constraint. Note that the condition 12 cbc BBB >=  always holds. Note 
that since the endowment in the domestic country is assumed to be very low relative to 
the lending country, the assumption of 23 cc BB > . In Figure 3.4, I 
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assume *0
*
1
**
2 eee −≤ β . There the region where there only the interior solution (a) 
exists, the only possibility is for 1<R , which is against the premises of this model. In 
the following section I illustrate these equilibria, with simulation results. 
 
 
 
Fig.3.4. Range for multiple equilibria (ii) 
 
 
III.4. Simulation results  
In the following I show figures for each equilibrium case presented in section III.3.2, 
using the following parameter space: 
20000 =e , 1* =β ; 9500*0 =e , 15000*1 =e , 150002 =e and [ ]9.0,1.0∈λ  and 
]3.2,5.1[∈R . The grid used was 0.1 for both the simulations over λ .and R . 
Figures 3.4 to 3.7 show the results for cases (a), (b), (c1) and (c2). Since c3 is an 
irregular set, it is impossible to pinpoint relative prices. Therefore I did not pursue any 
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simulation for that case. But one always can check whether the derived bound in 
proposition 3.1 would hold for any combination of ),( Rλ  given the endowments space. 
Figure 3.5 shows the results for the interior solution. Because of the perfect arbitrage 
condition, it is clear that the line displaying the values for R=02ρ  divides the space 
between 12ρ  and 01ρ . Obviously in this parameter space, 1201 ˆˆ ρρ < . This is because at 
0=t , the demand for the short-term debt is relatively elastic since there is no debt 
inherited. At 1=t , 01d  is inherited, so the bank would need to borrow (renew its short-
term debt) at 1=t  because of the illiquidity, described in this environment. Such a 
relatively inelastic demand leads to a higher interest rate. Note that 1ˆ0 01 << ρ  and 
1ˆ12 >ρ . In this goods’ economy, the interest rate 1ˆ0 01 << ρ  will be accepted by 
international lenders because the goods are perishable. In addition international lenders 
do not have a storage technology. So for each unit they lend, they can retrieve 01ρˆ  of the 
unit instead of zero. It is to be reminded that in the interior set the perfect arbitrage 
condition entails that quantities of the debt are not determined. So .the second graph in 
the upper right displays second short-term debt 12d : “d12aa”, “d12ab”, “d12ac” 
correspond to the values of },
2
,0{ˆ *0
*
0
01 e
eq = . Note that for *001ˆ eq = , the slope of the 
12qˆ  with respect to λ  and R  is higher than for the other cases. In all three cases 12qˆ  
increases with λ and decreases with R . 1c  is lower than 2c . For 1≤r , the interior 
solution will always abide by the incentive compatibility constraint. It depends on the 
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magnitude of λ,r and R  when 1>r . When it does not abide by the incentive 
compatibility constraint, then the equilibrium does not exist. 
Figure 3.6 shows the results for the case (b). Because of the presence of relative price 
determinacy, I normalize 1ˆ01 =ρ  and then simulate the model for this case. In case (b) 
0ˆ01 =q  and *002ˆ eq = . There is no initial short-term borrowing. Despite that, there is still 
short-term borrowing at 1=t  0ˆ12 >q . So in this equilibrium 12qˆ  is not a mere renewal or 
financing of an initial debt, it finances also impatient depositors’ withdrawal. Such 
equilibrium is comparable to case 2.2 in exogenous lending setup of chapter II. This is so 
because the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup creates a need for liquidity financing at 
1=t . This case exists in the parameter space chosen.  
Figure 3.7 shows the results for case (c.1). This case exhibits high second short-term 
borrowing and high long-term borrowing with interior 0ˆ01 >q . Note that consumptions 
of domestic depositors are positive only for high R  and λ . In fact this equilibrium exists 
only for 3.2=R . With high λ , 2c  becomes higher than 1c , in which case 12 rcc > is 
more likely to be fulfilled. Figure 3.8 shows case (c.2). There the same analysis 
presented on figure 3.7 can be given.  
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Fig.3.5. Set (a) 
The graph in the upper right displays second short-term debt d12aa, d12ab, d12ac corresponding to the 
values of },
2
,0{ *0
*
0
01 e
ed = . 
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The simulation results show that Cases (c.1) and (c.2) occur for very high R . In the 
analysis of existence, there are more conditions to guarantee existence such as the 
incentive compatibility constraint so that the ranking of the possibility of equilibria may 
not be the same as in figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
III.5. Conclusion 
When I allow for endogenous lending behavior, credit rationing will come out 
endogenously: *00201 ˆˆ eqq =+  and depending on each set I have derived bounds for 12qˆ . 
The simulation results and the analytical description of equilibria show that cases, where 
there is high demand for short-term debt 01d  or 12d , can exist for R  higher than some 
bounds.(see cases c.1 and c.2) This is different from the results with exogenous lending 
for two reasons: First in chapter II, low R  entailed a lower cost of liquidation and thus 
the choice of an equilibrium with only short-term debt arises. In chapter III, a lower R  
implies both a lower cost of liquidation and a lower 120102 ˆˆˆ ρρρ =  paid to international 
lenders at t=1: Thus with endogenous lending interest rates incorporate both the 
opportunity cost of “liquidity” and the “impatience” factor. Second, in the case with 
exogenous lending, high demand for short-term borrowing could not be concurrent with 
high demand for long-term debt because the form of the credit constraints was imposed 
exogenously. There a high demand for short-term debt implied that 001ˆ fd =  and 00ˆ2 =d . 
In this chapter, in both cases c.1 and c.2, where there is high debt for one of the short-
term debt, the demand for long-term debt is very high ( ∞→02d ). The tilt towards 
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longer or shorter maturity will depend on the equilibrium interest rates. In the following 
chapter I look at possible equilibria under reserve requirements imposed on the bank.  
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Fig.3.6. Set (b) 
In this case because of lack of determinacy but the presence of relative price determinacy, I assume for the 
simulation 101 =ρ . The graph in the upper right displays second short-term debt d12aa, d12ab, d12ac 
corresponding to the values of },
2
,0{ *0
*
0
01 e
ed = . 
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Fig.3.7. Set (c) Case c.1 
In this case because of lack of determinacy but the presence of relative price determinacy, I assume for the 
simulation 101 =ρ . The graph in the upper right displays second short-term debt d12aa, d12ab, d12ac 
corresponding to the values of },
2
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Fig.3.8. Set (c) Case c.2 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AND ENDOGENOUS LENDING 
In this chapter I look at the effect of special type of capital controls: date- and 
maturity- specific reserve requirements. In this chapter, like in earlier chapters, I assume 
there are no bank runs. In the next chapter, I will consider the role of such type of capital 
controls, when a bank run is possible. In Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002), the reserve 
requirements can be imposed on either the lender or the borrower and they are 
independent of date and maturity. In this chapter, I assume that reserve requirements are 
imposed on the borrowing bank and are date- and maturity- specific as in the Chilean 
case.  
IV.1. The domestic bank problem with reserve requirements  
The domestic economic authority imposes the reserve-requirement rates 
exogenously. It allows them to be both date-specific and maturity-specific. For instance, 
when the bank borrows from abroad, it must deposit in the central bank a fraction 1201,θθ  
and 02θ on 1201, dd  and 02d , respectively. In other words at t=0, a fraction 01θ  of the first 
short-term debt is placed as reserves at the central bank and will be returned to the 
domestic bank at t=1, i.e. when the debt matures. At t=0, a fraction 02θ  of the long-term 
debt is placed as reserves at the central bank and will be returned to the bank at t=2. At 
t=1, a fraction 12θ  of the second short-term debt is placed at the central bank as reserves 
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and will be returned to the bank at t=2.18 Clearly, ]1,0[01 ∈θ , ]1,0[12 ∈θ  and ]1,0[02 ∈θ . 
Then the budget constraints of the bank become: 
020201100 )1()1( ddek θθ −+−+≤                                                                      (4.1) 
0101121201011 )1( drlddc θθρλ ++−≤+                                                                         (4.2) 
02021212020212122 )()1( ddlkRddc θθρρλ ++−≤++−                                                   (4.3) 
In anticipation of what the reader will find in chapter V, I would like to point out that, by 
looking at the budget constraints (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), it is possible to distinguish two 
roles that reserve requirements may play if a bank run at 1=t  occurs. First, at t=0, a 
fraction 01θ  and a fraction 02θ  are placed as reserves for every unit of 01d  and 02d , and 
therefore investment in k  is penalized. Thus at t=0, the reserve requirement rate 01θ  and 
02θ  operates like a tax. Similarly at t=1, 12θ  plays the role of a “tax”. However at t=1, a 
fraction 01θ  of the maturing short-term debt is returned as reserves and guarantees at 
least a partial payment of the debt to the international lenders, reducing the need for early 
liquidation of the long term asset. This is similar to the role of “liquidity”. Note that 
when 12θ  is applied to any new issuance of debt at t=1, the new borrowing which is 
financing any liquidity shortage would need to be higher. This could precipitate a crisis if 
the demand for short-term borrowing is not satisfied by the supply side. At t=2, fractions 
12θ  and 02θ  of the respective short-term and long-term maturing bonds are returned to 
                                                 
18 Note that in this setup the focus is on the case in which reserve requirements are returned to the bank 
when the debt matures, neither before nor after. Also it is assumed for simplicity that the reserve 
requirement does not earn any interest when held at the central bank. This is consistent with reality in 
which interest rates on reserve requirements are relatively lower than on other assets. One can think of the 
reserve requirement as a risk-less technology which gives back the good when the debt matures at a gross 
rate of return equal to one. 
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the domestic bank. This is again the “liquidity” role of 12θ  and 02θ . Notice that for a 
single date- and maturity- specific reserve requirement rate, the “liquidity” role and the 
“tax” role work in opposite directions and at two different dates. It is therefore an 
interesting policy question to ask which of the two effects dominates and under which 
circumstances.19 In the next sections, I identify the sets of equilibria that arise with 
reserve requirements. Then I compare them with the sets without reserve requirements. 
In this chapter I assume there is no bank run. 
IV.2. Equilibria 
The main concern in this chapter is to look at how imposing reserve requirements 
on external debt change the behavior of the borrowing bank. In appendix C, I derive the 
relevant conditions for the borrowing bank optimization problem. In this section, I 
proceed by assuming logarithmic utility functions for both lenders and borrowers. In this 
economy, a competitive equilibrium is a set of interest rates }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 021201 ρρρ , a set of 
international bonds’ allocations }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 021201 qqq , a set of allocations for the typical domestic 
bank },,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 02120121 dddcck  and a set of allocations for the typical international 
lender },,,ˆ,ˆ{ 0212012
*
1 ssscc  given },,,,,{
**
2
*
1
*
00 βλeeee  and the reserve requirements 
rates },,{ 021201 θθθ  such that:  
                                                 
19 In anticipation of the analysis in chapter V, the “liquidity” role is an ex-ante preventive mechanism of a 
crisis. But in the event of a crisis, the “tax” role might create a worse outcome because it could make it 
more difficult to borrow.  
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i. },,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 02120121 dddcck  solve the domestic bank problem of maximizing (2.1) 
subject to (4.1), (4.2) (4.3) and (2.7).  
ii. },,,ˆ,ˆ{ 0212012
*
1 ssscc  solve the international lender problem of maximizing (3.1) 
subject to (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). 
iii. Markets clear: 010101 qˆsd == , 121212 qˆsd == , 020202 qˆsd == .  
Table (4.1) summarizes all possible cases with or without reserve requirements. In the 
remainder of this section, I will explain each set of equilibria separately. Note that (2.8) 
for international lenders is both the pre- and post-reserve requirement perfect arbitrage 
condition. For comparability purpose with the case without reserve requirement, I focus 
on the case where the post-reserve requirement arbitrage condition for the lender, i.e. 
equation (2.8) always holds. Note that under this condition, by assumption, there is no 
case where the borrower is at its interior solution but the lender is not. For the borrower 
the post-reserve requirement perfect arbitrage condition is the following: 
)1(
)(
)1(
)(.
)1(
)(
02
0202
12
1212
01
0101
θ
θρ
θ
θρ
θ
θρ
−
−=−
−
−
−                                                                (4.4) 
In addition all the derived condition for the existence should be consistent with (4.4) and 
(2.8).The results in this section are to be compared with (a) and (c) of chapter III. Case 
(b) is one in which the condition (4.4) would hold but not (2.8), because the borrower is 
interior but not the lender: this case is not of much interest unlike (c) because it displays 
no indeterminacy. The listed equilibria are consistent with both (4.4) and (2.8). I will 
group the equilibria like before according to the general behavior of the agents in the 
world economy: set (a’) both the borrowing banks and the international lenders are at an 
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interior solution. (c’) The international lenders are at an interior solution but the banks 
are willing to borrow as much as possible. Case (c’) will be divided into 6 subsets. To 
characterize each set I will use the concept of indeterminacy I developed in chapter III, in 
section III.3.1.  
Set (a’) Both lenders and borrowers are at their interior solutions: 0ˆ010101 ≥== qds , 
0ˆ010202 ≥== qds and 0ˆ121212 >== qds . There exist at most two possible equilibria 
depending on the combination of reserve requirements. The interest rates satisfy 3 
equations: (2.8), (4.4) and the following: 
020202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−= R                                                                                         (4.5) 
(4.5) is derived from the first order condition with respect to 02d  equal to zero. Note that 
without reserve requirements R=02ρˆ , a higher long-term interest rate than with reserve 
requirements.  Thus the interest rate 12ρˆ  solves the quadratic equation 
0ˆˆ 3122
2
121 =++ ςρςρς                                                                                       (4.6) 
 where 011 θς = , )()]1()1)(1[( 1201020201122 θθθθθθς +−−−−−= R  and 
1202023 ])1([ θθθς +−= R . 
In order to guarantee that a  unique set of interest rates arises rather than two sets of 
interest rate with the imposition of reserve requirement, the policymaker would 
implement a combination of },,{ 021201 θθθ such that a unique interest rate 12ρˆ  would 
solve equation (4.6), following the rule:  
31
2
2 4 ςςς =                                                                                                          (4.7) 
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Table 4.1.                                                                                                                                               
Comparative summary between the equilibria without and with reserve requirements20 
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To derive analytically the implied relation between the three reserve requirements in 
equation (4.7) is an arduous task. However in section IV.3, I show simulation results for 
                                                 
20 I assume for comparability that all equilibria are consistent with both (2.8) and (4.4). This is why case 
(b) does not have its counterpart after reserve requirement are introduced. 
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the interior sets. The simulation results show that for (4.7) to hold with non-negative 
borrowing, the combination of reserve requirements satisfies always the following 
condition  
011202 θθθ >>                                                                                                     (4.8) 
I will discuss later the simulation results in details. In any case with reserve 
requirements, unlike the case without reserve requirements, the bonds are determined by 
the following equations at the interior solution for the equilibrium interest rates:  
]ˆ
ˆ1
[
ˆ
)1(ˆ
1212
0*
001
12
*
2
*
*
1
*
0112
12
01 θρ
λρρβ
β
ρθ
θ
−−−−+
−= eReeeq                                              (4.9) 
01
*
002 ˆˆ qeq −=                                                                                                     (4.10) 
1212
0
01
12
0101
12 ˆ
ˆ
1
ˆˆ θρ
λ
θ
θρ
−+−
−= eRqq                                                                             (4.11) 
Note that at the interior solution without reserve requirements, there was an 
indeterminate set of the quantities. Note that for the case without reserve requirements, a 
unique point for interest rates exists at the interior set. The number of equilibrium was 
infinite because of indeterminate quantities. Thus, a combination of non-zero 
},,{ 021201 θθθ  could cause bifurcations towards two equilibria or a unique equilibrium, 
depending on whether the vector },,{ 021201 θθθ  is arbitrary or satisfy (4.7). A bifurcation 
is defined in this setup which is not dynamic, as a change in number of equilibria when 
the values of },,{ 021201 θθθ  change.21 I have identified two possibilities when 
                                                 
21 Bifurcations of equilibria are of three types “when structural parameters change, that is, in changes in the 
number of steady states, their stability type, and the nature of orbits near a given equilibrium.”(Azariadis 
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},,{ 021201 θθθ , change from zero to some positive. If (4.7) is satisfied, then a bifurcation 
towards a unique equilibrium arises. In the simulation results I give an illustration of the 
two cases. The following figure is not derived analytically it is only to be used for the 
purpose of illustration. Let }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ˆ 021201 qqqq ≡ , and }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ˆ 021201 ρρρρ =  be the vectors of 
equilibrium quantities and interest rates, and },,{ 021201 θθθθ ≡  the vector of reserve 
requirements (structural parameters). I illustrate in figure 4.1 how different bifurcations 
may occur. Note that when there are no reserve requirements, there is a unique set of 
interest rates but indeterminate quantities. Thus the number of equilibria is infinite when 
there are no reserve requirements. When the set of reserve requirement changes from 
zero to an arbitrary ]1,(),[ zyx θθθθ ∪∈ , then there is a bifurcation towards two sets of 
equilibria. When it changes to ],[ zy θθθ ∈ , a bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium 
occurs. When ],[ zy θθθ ∈ , equation (4.7) is satisfied and thus the inequality (4.8) holds. 
(c’)The lender is at the interior solution. The borrower is not at the interior 
solution: The cases (c’.1), (c’.2), and (c’.3) are the cases that are directly comparable 
with the sets (c.1), (c.2) and (c.3). With the imposition of reserve requirements three 
subsets of equilibria arises additionally in comparison with the case without reserve 
requirements: these are (c’.4), (c’.5) and (c’.6). 
Equilibria (c’.1), (c’.2), (c’.3) and (c’.4) are characterized by the following 
condition: 
020202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−< R                                                                                       (4.12) 
                                                                                                                                                 
1993, pp.91) In this setup, which is not dynamic, I am interested in the first type: the change in number of 
equilibria.  
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Fig.4.1.Bifurcations with reserve requirements at the interior set 
 
 
Case (c’.1) There exists a set in which the bank is willing to borrow as much as possible 
long-term debt at t=0 ∞→02d and short at t=1 ∞→12d but is within her interior 
solution for 001 ≥d  . Here the long term interest rate is such that 020202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−< R . 
This case is comparable to the case without reserve requirement (c.1) where R<02ρˆ . In 
addition the second short-term interest rate is relatively cheap: 121212 )1(ˆ θθρ +−< r . One 
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can see that here there is more restriction on the set of possible long-term interest rate 
and second- short-term interest rates. Unlike the case without reserve requirements, given 
the normalized equilibrium sets of interest rates, bonds are determined: 
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010112120112
0202010102010101
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R
R
. In addition the quantities 
for the other bonds }ˆ,ˆ{ 1202 qq  can be determined from (3.2) and (3.25). Considering the 
perfect arbitrage case from both the borrowers (4.5) and the lenders (4.4), there are two 
equations for relative prices, and thus they are determined. This is a similar result to the 
case without reserve requirements. In this case given the normalized set of interest rates, 
quantities are also determined unlike the case without reserve requirements.  
Case (c’.2) At t=0, the borrower would like to borrow as much as possible of the first 
short-term bond ∞→01d  and the long-term bond ∞→02d because both interest rates 
rr <+−< 010101 )1(ˆ θθρ  and RR <+−< 020202 )1(ˆ θθρ  are relatively cheap. Note also 
that the bounds are more restrictive than in the case without reserve requirement. Here 
the demand for the second short-term debt is an interior solution. 012 ≥d . In this case 
also quantities are determined given the interest rates:  
)
1
ˆ
)1(ˆ1
)(ˆ(]))ˆ)1(([{1ˆ *
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*
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eeeeReRq   (4.14) 
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where
011212
02
0202
12
12120101
01022 ˆ)ˆ)1(
)ˆ(
)1(
)ˆ)(ˆ()1()( ρθρθ
θρλθ
θρθρλθθλγ −(−−
−+−
−−−+−= R . In addition 
the quantities for the other bonds }ˆ,ˆ{ 1202 qq  can be determined from (3.2) and (3.25). 
Considering the perfect arbitrage case from both the borrowers (4.5) and the lenders 
(4.4), there are two equations for relative prices, and thus they are determined. This is a 
similar result to the case without reserve requirements. Unlike the case without reserve 
requirements, in this case given the normalized set of equilibrium interest rates, 
quantities are also determined.  
Case (c’.3) The borrower is willing to borrow as much as possible, using all types of 
bonds: ∞→01d ∞→02d and ∞→12d . However, given the borrower’s budget 
constraints, this cannot be the case unless there is some trade off between 01d and 12d  
which explain the bounds on 12d . For this case, all three interest rates are perceived by 
the borrower as relatively cheap because RR <+−< 020202 )1(ˆ θθρ , 
rr <+−< 010101 )1(ˆ θθρ , rr <+−< 121212 )1(ˆ θθρ . Note that the post-reserve 
requirement no arbitrage condition (4.5) may or may not hold. If it does not hold, c’.3 is 
irregular with the only equation (4.4), however the bounds on the 3 interest rates are 
smaller, reducing the scope of indeterminacy. In comparison with the case without 
reserve requirements, I am focusing though on the cases when both (4.4) and (4.5) would 
hold, thus with two equations and three unknown interest rates, relative interest rates are 
determined. Without reserve requirements, this was an irregular set: with reserve 
requirements, it becomes a regular one. 
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I have shown in the three cases (c’.1), (c’.2), and (c’.3) that reserve requirements 
add determinacy to the system of interest rates and quantities of bonds when perfect 
arbitrage is allowed in comparison with (c.1), (c.2) and (c.3). Additional 3 cases are 
added when date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements are imposed. (c’.4) and 
(c’.5) are equilibria where at 0=t , only long-term borrowing occurs. (c’.6) is a case 
where the domestic bank borrows only short-term debt. 
Additional ones:  
Case (c’.4) the borrower does not want to borrow short at t=0. She wants to borrow long 
as much as possible ∞→02d . In addition, the bank would like to borrow as much as 
possible at t=2 ∞→12d . Therefore it is found that R<−
−
−
−
01
0101
12
1212
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
θ
θρ
θ
θρ  and 
020202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−< R , which limits the space between the three interest rates. The set of 
prices with (4.4) and (4.6) is comparable to the above case (c’.3). The difference is in the 
quantities. There is also some bound for 12qˆ . 
0ˆ01 =q                                                                                                              (4.15) 
*
002ˆ eq =                                                                                                            (4.16) 
]
ˆ
ˆ[
)1(
1ˆ
12
*
*
001
*
1
*
*12 ρρββ
eeeq −−+=                                                                (4.17) 
1212
0
1212
020212
12 ˆ)ˆ(
)}ˆ()1({ˆ0 θρ
λ
θρ
θρθλ
−−
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Case (c’.5) The borrower does not want to borrow short at t=0 001 =d , but the long term 
debt is interior 002≥d  and at t=1 the bank would like to borrow as much as possible 
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∞→12d . Because the long term debt is interior 002≥d , like in case (a’), (4.6) holds so 
that 02202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−= R . Since 020112 ˆˆˆ ρρρ = , it is found that 02021201 )1(ˆˆ θθρρ +−= R . 
This is a curve on the sheet defined by the no arbitrage condition. In addition 
121212 )1(ˆ θθρ +−≤ r  means that effectively 12d  is relatively cheap, this explains why the 
bank would like to borrow as much as possible of it. At equilibrium the bonds quantities 
are the same as displayed in (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18). 
In addition the bound on 12qˆ is such that: 
1212
0
12 ˆ
ˆ0 θρ
λ
−≤<
eRq                                                                                            (4.19) 
Note that the higher 12θ , the higher the bound. This seems at first glance counterintuitive 
but in fact it pinpoints to the liquidity role of 12d for the borrower at t=1. Note that this 
might replicate cases where financial repression create liquidity crisis like South Korea 
in the seventies and the late 1990s. There are two equations for the three interest rates 
space if only the perfect arbitrage condition in the lending economy is considered. Then 
the system is regular. Considering that I am focusing on the cases with perfect arbitrage 
in both economies, the system of 3 interest rates is determinate with the presence of 3 
equations. Note that the interest rates that solve these three equations could be at most 2 
and are of the same magnitude as the interior case (a’). The difference from (a’) is in the 
quantities as pointed in (4.15), (4.16) and (4.17).  
Case (c’.6) The borrower is not willing to borrow long-term 002 =d  and willing to 
borrow as much as possible short at 1=t ∞→12d because 121212 )1(ˆ θθρ +−< r . The 
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demand for the first short-term debt is interior 001 ≥d . A condition for this equilibrium to 
exist is that: 
020202 )1(ˆ θθρ +−> R                                                                                      (4.20) 
At equilibrium market clear so that quantities are determined respectively by: 
*
001ˆ eq =                                                                                                            (4.21) 
0ˆ02 =q                                                                                                              (4.22) 
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Note that for the cases (c’.6) at equilibrium 0202120102 )1( θθρρρ +−>= R . In this case 
without post-reserve requirements no arbitrage condition, the system is irregular. With 
the post-reserve requirements condition (4.5) and the no arbitrage condition from the 
lender side (4.4), the relative interest rates are determined. It is important to see if it is 
within the capacity of the bank to pay back her short-term debt.  Suppose one unit is 
borrowed, the )1( 01θ− will be invested in the illiquid investment so that at t=2: it will get 
a return equal to )1( 01θ−R . The remaining reserves will be returned at t=1 and if 
reinvested in the long term asset will only get r)1( 1201 θθ − . At t=2 1201θθ  reserves will be 
returned. Therefore there is an implicit marginal return   for this economy that should be 
higher than the cost of interest payments: 12011201120101 )1()1( ρρθθθθθ ≥+−+− rR . This 
means that if the reserve requirements are set such 
that 02021201120101 )1()1()1( θθθθθθθ +−≤+−+− RrR , then case (c’.6) is not anymore 
possible equilibrium. 
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Proposition 4: When the condition 
)1(
)1()( 1201
02 −
−+−≤
R
rrR θθθ  holds, it is possible to 
rule out the case created with the imposition of reserve requirements were only short-
term borrowing exists.  
 
Note that if 1201 θθ = , then the condition in the above proposition becomes 
simply 011202 θθθ =≤ . In Chile the reserve requirements were maturity-specific but not 
date specific initially (in 1992), i.e similar to the case where 1201 θθ = . Only in 1998 all 
reserve requirements on external borrowing were removed. One could argue perhaps that 
in Chile, the implementation was successful because the policy was targeting a tilt 
towards long maturity such that 011202 θθθ =≤ . Note that this is in conflict with the result 
at the interior solution. In set (a’) I have argued that simulation results show that for a 
bifurcation towards a unique set of interest rates, or for (4.8) to be satisfied: the 
simulation example show that 0102 θθ > .I have shown in section IV.2, that date- and 
maturity- specific reserve requirements add determinacy to quantities of date- and 
maturity- specific bonds. I have shown that 011202 θθθ =≤  would mean that there are no 
equilibria where only short-term borrowing exists. It is important to note that in all 
equilibria without reserve requirements the condition 021201 ρρρ =  is necessary for their 
existence. Such a condition is the lender and the borrower perfect arbitrage condition. 
After the imposition of reserve requirements, the interior solution is the only equilibrium 
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which requires necessarily both (4.4) and (4.5) for existence. Therefore I focus on the 
interior solution in the simulation results of the next section and in the next chapter. 
In the next section, with a numerical example, I will show that at the interior solution 
0102 θθ <  creates bifurcation towards two equilibria. I will demonstrate from the 
simulation results, that it is always the case that 0102 θθ >  for a bifurcation towards a 
unique equilibrium. Another issue that is hardly addressed in models a la Diamond and 
Dybvig, is welfare comparison. The simulation results provide welfare comparisons. In 
the next section, I first show how bifurcation arises. Second I give a brief welfare 
comparison.  
IV.3. Simulation results 
IV.3.1. Different bifurcations with reserve requirements 
For comparability with the case without reserve requirements, I use the same 
parameters used for the simulation results in chapter III: 
20000 =e , 1* =β ; 9500*0 =e , 15000*1 =e , 150002 =e and [ ]9.0,1.0∈λ an ]3.2,5.1[∈R .  
In the first experiment, I impose exogenously the three rates of reserve 
requirements 3.001 =θ , 2.002 =θ , and 1.012 =θ . The choice of the reserve requirements 
is consistent with the Chilean case. Note that interest rates that solve equation (4.6) are 
independent of λ , the impatience fraction. Reserve requirements stabilize all interest 
rates across λ . As shown analytically in section IV.2, the simulation results show that 
there are two positive sets of interest rates that solve equation (4.7). Figure 4.2 shows 
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that both post-reserve-requirement interest rate of the second short term debt are lower 
than the ones before reserve requirement.  
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Fig.4.2. Bifurcation towards two equilibria, with reserve requirements. 
Given 3.001 =θ , 2.002=θ  and 1.012 =θ . The grid used was 0.1 for both the simulations over λ and R  
 
 
In the second experiment, for ]85.0;05.0[01 ∈θ , 45.012 =θ , I find the 02θ  which 
provides bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium (i.e solves (4.7)). The simulation 
results show that 0102 θθ > . Even though I display the results for 15.012 =θ , I have tried 
with other values for 12θ , the pattern is always 0102 θθ > . The reason why I report the 
results with 45.012 =θ  is that for low values of 12θ , the borrowing in some or all of the 
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bonds become negative. In the case when 45.012 =θ , for all R  and for 15.001 =θ , 
borrowing is still positive in all assets and depending on R  , 02θ  varies from 0.48 to 0.59, 
decreasing with an increase in R . Figure 4.3 was constructed with a grid of 0.01, and 100 
repetitions. It shows for 5.1=R , that 02θ  decreases with low values of 01θ  and increases 
with high 01θ . To construct this graph I remove the case when 102 ≥θ  is found in the 
simulations because they are out of range. Such cases correspond to extreme low and 
extreme high 01θ . Observing the simulation results by looking at R  increasing or 
01θ increasing, all cases show that 011202 θθθ >> . This raises the question to 
why 011202 θθθ >>  for no bifurcation to occur. A simple answer in a model with 
endogenous international lending is perhaps that reserve requirements’ role as a liquidity 
provider in this model dominates that of a tax. I will be able to explain further this 
intuition once I get to chapter V, where a bank run is allowed.  
In the next section I look at a welfare comparison between the case with and without 
reserve requirements for the interior solutions. For the case with reserve requirements, I 
look at both the cases with bifurcation.  
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Fig.4.3. 02θ  as a function 01θ for bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium 
assuming that 45.012 =θ  and 5.1=R  
 
 
IV.3.2. Welfare comparison 
The first panel in figure 4.4 shows the welfare comparison for the domestic economy. 
The red lines correspond to the case without reserve requirements. The green and the 
blue lines correspond to the case with reserve requirements resulting in bifurcation. For 
low λ , reserve requirements, with the bifurcation towards two interest rates, increase 
welfare for the domestic economy. These results are not considering yet the case with 
bank run, which will be considered in chapter V. For high λ , reserve requirements 
decrease welfare. In anticipation of results in chapter V, note that when λ is very 
low, )1( λ− , the fraction of patient depositors, or potential runners is high. Thus when 
λ is low, the bank will need more resources to deal with a bank run. The second panel in 
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figure 4.4 shows that international lenders are always worse off with reserve 
requirements compared to the case without reserve requirements.  
I turn to analyze the results from the case when I impose reserve requirements so that 
a bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium. I pursue my analysis by varying 01θ and 
finding the corresponding 02θ  that guarantees (4.8) when 45.012 =θ , for all R . Like 
before I choose 15.001 =θ  where borrowing is still positive in all bonds and depending 
on R  , 02θ  varies from 0.48 to 0.59, decreasing with an increase in R . The left upper and 
lower panels show for 2.0=λ  the utility for domestic borrowers and international 
lenders respectively. The right upper and lower panels show for 8.0=λ the utility for 
domestic borrowers and international lenders respectively. For low (high) λ , a set of 
date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements improve (decrease) welfare of domestic 
depositors. For low (high) λ , a set of date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements 
improve (decrease) welfare of international lenders when R is not too high (low). Note 
that in this model banks are competitors, and thus a single bank disregards the effect of 
its borrowing on aggregate borrowing.22 This results in an over-borrowing distortion. In 
fact it is an equilibrium result that with or without reserve requirements the total 
borrowing at t=0 is equal to *0e . But in particular, reserve requirements increase the 
second-short-term interest rate and thus decrease new borrowing at t=1. This indeed 
decreases overall borrowing across the two periods and thus reduces the described over-
borrowing distortion. Such a distortion is less pronounced with high λ . Note that 
                                                 
22 See Auernheimer and Garcia (2000).  
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international lenders are always worse off, when reserve requirements lead to the 
bifurcation towards two equilibria. In comparison figure 4.5 shows the case with 
bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium: the association of bifurcation towards a unique 
equilibrium with the possibility of welfare improvement, imply that there might be an 
association between higher utility and higher determinacy. 
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Fig.4.4. Welfare of domestic borrowers and international with and without reserve requirements (with 
bifurcation towards two equilibria). 
Results from 0.1 grid with 10x10 repetitions in the simulation. I have assumed 3.001 =θ , 2.002 =θ and 
1.012 =θ  
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IV.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I show analytically that reserve requirements reduce the scope of 
indeterminacy. For the interior solution, I show with simulations what combination of 
date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements would create a unique equilibrium at 
the interior solution. Then I analyze welfare implications of different combination of 
date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements. In practice the implementation of 
reserve requirements is used as a preventive mechanism to avoid financial crises. In the 
next chapter I introduce in the setup I developed in chapters III and IV, the possibility of 
an unanticipated bank run. I analyze the role of reserve requirements in preventing crises 
as well as explore the ex-post crises role of international lenders in bailing out the 
domestic bank. 
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Fig.4.5. Welfare of domestic borrowers and international with and without reserve requirements ( with 
bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium). 
Results from 0.1 grid with 10x10 repetitions in the simulation  
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CHAPTER V 
COUNTRIES ON THE VERGE OF A NERVOUS BREAKDOWN23:                                  
ARE THERE ANY CURES? 
V.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I analyze the vulnerability to a bank run of equilibria identified in the 
model I described in chapter III and IV. To introduce sunspots in the simplest possible 
way, I assume that a bad dream will unexpectedly occur at 1=t . If an unexpected bad 
dream is seen by domestic depositors at t=1 and the bank position signals that it is unable 
to pay back all the withdrawals i.e. is in an illiquid position, a bank run will occur. I 
focus on cases where the rule of the domestic banking system is such that, in case of a 
bank run, domestic depositors get paid prior to international lenders. Note that at t=0, 
international lenders and the domestic banks agree on 1201 ˆ,ˆ qq  and 02qˆ . However, only 
01qˆ  and 02qˆ  are actually traded at t=0. Only at t=1 would 12qˆ  be actually traded. 12qˆ  
indicates an optimal anticipated amount at t=0 of new lending at 1=t . If new events 
happen such as a bank run, international lenders may find it optimal to deviate from the 
original decision of lending 12qˆ . 
In this chapter I will first look at how a bank run arises. What is the illiquidity 
condition along which a bad dream creates the bank run? Second, I will see whether 
date- and maturity- specific reserve requirements can prevent the occurrence of a bank 
run. Third when a bank run occurs, I will explore the re-optimizing behavior of 
                                                 
23 The first part of the title is inspired by the title of the 1988 movie: “Women on the verge of a nervous 
breakdown”, by Pedro Almodovar. This is because in this setup, the introduction of a bank run requires the 
realization of a bad dream.  
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international lenders in deciding whether or not to lend at 1=t . Thus this chapter deals 
with the cause of a banking crisis, the assessment of an ex-ante preventive policy, and an 
ex-post bailout strategy by international lenders. 
V.2. The emergence of a bank run in the setup without reserve requirements 
V.2.1. Defining the illiquidity condition 
At t=0, given the decisions of 1201 ˆ,ˆ qq  and 02qˆ , international lenders and domestic 
depositors can observe whether the bank would be liquid or not in the case of a bank run 
at t=1. There are two possibilities: either the bank holds a liquid position or it holds an 
illiquid position. If the bank holds a liquid position, there is never a bank run, 
independently of whether or not there is a bad dream. If the bank holds an illiquid 
position, domestic depositors will run to the bank if and only if they see a bad dream. 
Thus the illiquidity condition is as follows  
krqc ˆˆˆˆ 01011 >+ ρ                                                                                                  (5.1) 
Under the rules assumed for the domestic financial system, the domestic depositors 
perceive the bank position as strongly illiquid when it cannot pay for all their 
withdrawals, even if it liquidated at t=1 all its investment k. A stronger illiquidity 
condition would therefore be krc ˆˆ1 > . Note that if krc ˆˆ1 >  holds, the illiquidity condition 
(5.1) must hold. 
In my model the domestic depositors will run to the bank if two conditions exist:  
(i) The domestic depositors see a bad dream, in this context, the random variable 
takes at t=1 the value 1.  
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(ii) The illiquidity condition krqc ˆˆˆˆ 01011 >+ ρ holds. 
 
 
 
Fig 5.1. Decision tree at t=1 
Figure 5.1 summarizes how a bank run would occur. Note that figure 5.1 will be used in 
section V.3. 
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V.2.2. Comparison of illiquidity conditions across all equilibria without reserve 
requirements 
 
To look at the vulnerability to bank runs of each set of equilibria at 1=t , I assess 
(5.1) in each of the sets (a), (b) and (c) described in chapter III, with no reserve 
requirements. For the interior solution (a), the quantities of 01qˆ  are not determined. There 
the illiquidity condition is the following: 
0
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eReeRrq −++++> β
βλ                                           (5.2) 
Note that since ],0[ˆ *001 eq ∈ , if 0ˆ01 →q , this equilibrium is less likely to be vulnerable to 
illiquidity. If *001ˆ eq → , it will be more likely to be vulnerable.  
For the case (b), the illiquidity condition is such that r
ee
e >+ *00
001ρˆ . Since this set has no 
price determinacy, by normalizing 1ˆ01 =ρ , the illiquidity condition becomes 
r
ee
e >+ *00
0                                                                                                    (5.3) 
All cases in (c) have no price determinacy. Thus by normalizing 1ˆ01 =ρ , the illiquidity 
condition becomes  
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eeeeerq                              (5.4) 
The ranking of the interior solution (a) and the sets (b) and (c), with regard to 
vulnerability to a bank run depends on how the bounds in (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) are 
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relative to each other. This in turn is dependent on the parameters configuration. In the 
next section I look at simulation results for the interior solution for two reasons. The first 
reason is tractability. The second is the fact that two types of bifurcation may occur 
depending on the combinations of reserve requirements. 
 V.2.3. Simulation results 
For comparability with the results in chapter IV and V, I use the same parameters 
used for the simulation results in chapter III: 20000 =e , 1* =β ; 9500*0 =e , 
15000*1 =e , 150002 =e  , [ ]9.0,1.0∈λ  and ]3.2,5.1[∈R . The simulations were repeated 
over different values of λ  and R . In this section I focus on the simulation at the interior 
solution. For 1.1=r , the interior solution is never vulnerable to a bank run. In table 5.1, I 
illustrate results for 7.0=r  and 3.0=r . It was shown in chapter III that the interior 
solution (a) has indeterminacy in quantities, thus it might be that the equilibrium results 
is such that 0ˆ01 =q , or *001ˆ eq =  or anything in between for the first short-term debt. 
For 7.0=r  and 3.0=r , when 0ˆ01 =q , the equilibrium at the interior solution is not 
vulnerable to a bank run. In table 5.1, I look at the case when *001 9.0ˆ eq =  since I am 
interested in looking at whether reserve requirement can reduce the scope of illiquidity 
and thus prevent a bank run. Table 5.1 shows the presence or not of illiquidity at the 
interior solution with no reserve requirements. When 3.0=r , for all pairs ),( Rλ , the 
interior set with *001 9.0 ed =  is vulnerable to a bank run. When 7.0=r , notice that for a 
combination of low R and low λ or a combination of high R and high λ , the interior 
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case with high short-term debt *001 9.0 ed =  is vulnerable to bank runs. The higher R , the 
more relatively costly to liquidate at 1=t . Even if λ is low, when R  is low, the 
opportunity cost of liquidating is not that high. The environment is liquid. If λ  is 
high, )1( λ− , the fraction of patient or potential depositors is low: the environment is 
liquid. 
 
 
Table 5.1.                                                                                                                                                     
Presence of illiquidity at the interior solution 
Illiquidity presence : (a) with d01=0.9e0star for r=0.3
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Illiquidity presence : (a) with d01=0.9e0star for r=0.7
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.5 0 0 0 0 n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e. n.e.
1.6 1 0 0 0 0 0 n.e. n.e. n.e.
1.7 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 n.e. n.e.
1.8 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 n.e.
1.9 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
2.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
2.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ/R
λ/R
 
1 indicates presence of illiquidity, 0 indicates liquidity. Where n.e. indicates that the equilibrium does not 
exist for the condition of r>01ρˆ  is not satisfied  
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V.3. Can reserve requirements prevent the occurrence of a bank run? 
V.3.1. Illiquidity conditions with reserve requirements 
In the setup with reserve requirements, at 1=t , 0101qˆθ  goods, the reserves are 
returned to the domestic bank by the domestic authority. The illiquidity condition takes 
the following form:  
krcq ˆˆˆ)ˆ( 1010101 >+−θρ                                                                                      (5.5) 
At the interior solution I compare the vulnerability to a bank run between the cases with 
and without reserve requirements. Note that when 001 >θ  and/or 002 >θ  
01010202
*
00 ˆ)()1(ˆ qeek θθθ −+−+=                                                                   (5.6) 
Note that at t=0, the reserve requirements 01θ  and 02θ  play a tax role since for 001 >θ  
and 002 >θ , from (5.6), *00ˆ eek +< . Thus with these reserve requirements, investment 
in k  is lower than investment without reserve requirements. The illiquidity condition 
becomes 
)(ˆ
1)}1(}
1
ˆ
{ˆ
010201
02
*
00
01
0101
01 θθρθθ
θρ
−−−+−
−−>
r
reerq                                   (5.7) 
The liquidity role of 01θ  and 02θ will be captured at t=1 and t=2 respectively. 
V.3.2 Simulation results 
When reserve requirements are imposed and if bifurcation towards two equilibria 
occurs, there will be two 01ρˆ : one high corresponding to low 12ρˆ and one low 
corresponding to a high 12ρˆ . The susceptibility to a bank run will depend also on how 
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01qˆ is changing. Figure 5.2 shows the results for the case when bifurcation towards two 
equilibria results. To construct figure 5.2, I have imposed exogenously 3.001 =θ , 
2.002 =θ and 1.012 =θ . In table 5.2, the case with high (low) 12ρˆ is always (never) 
vulnerable to a bank run.  
 
 
Table 5.2.                                                                                                                                                  
Illiquidity presence at the interior solution with reserve requirements (bifurcation towards 2 equilibria)  
Illiquidity presence when RR (with 2 possible interest rates) with r=0.3
 with high  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 with low  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
λ/R
λ/R 12
ρˆ
12ρˆ
 
1 indicates presence of illiquidity, 0 indicates liquidity. It is assumed that 3.001 =θ , 
2.002 =θ and 1.012 =θ . This table shows the results only for 3.0=r . The case with 7.0=r is 
particular: There only the result with high 12ρˆ  satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint resulting in 
r>−
−
12
1212
1
ˆ
θ
θρ . 
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In the second experiment, for ]85.0;05.0[01 ∈θ , 45.012 =θ , I find the 02θ  which 
provides no bifurcation . As mentioned in chapter IV, the simulation results show 
that 0102 θθ > . Table 5.3 show the presence or not of illiquidity for 7.0=r  and 3.0=r . 
The same result applies for 2.0=λ  and 2.0=λ . One can see that again with high λ , the 
vulnerability to a run decreases. Note that there are several combinations for each R  that 
can prevent a run from occurring. For instance for 8.0=λ  and 2.2=R , the interior 
solution without reserve requirements is vulnerable to a run (see table 5.1). A 
set 3.001 =θ , 2.002 =θ and 1.012 =θ , creates a bifurcation towards two equilibria: one of 
the emerging equilibria is always vulnerable to a bank run. From the simulation results 
that I used to get table 5.3, a combination of 15.001 =θ , 0.4808602 =θ and 
45.012 =θ guarantees no bifurcation and no vulnerability to a bank run.  
For uniqueness and non-negative borrowing, one finds that 0102 θθ >  and 0112 θθ > . 
This seems to stress the role of reserve requirements as liquidity providers. If this is the 
case, one expects to identify that for the combinations of },,{ 021201 θθθ that leads to a 
unique set of interest rates and no bank run, there must be a positive relation between the 
quantity at equilibrium of each bond and its corresponding reserve requirement. In other 
words for the liquidity role to dominate the tax role, 01qˆ , 12qˆ  and 02qˆ should increase with 
higher 01θ , 12θ and 02θ  respectively for the sets when no bank run occurs. Simulation 
results confirm the positive relation between 01qˆ , 02qˆ and 01θ , 02θ respectively. For these 
experiments 12θ was fixed. If for both the long-term and the short-term bonds, the 
liquidity role dominates, does it mean that both reserve requirements encourage more 
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borrowing of all bonds? The answer is no. Since the reserve requirements are date- and 
maturity- specific to each bond: a policy with 0102 θθ >  would imply a tilt towards a 
longer maturity structure when the liquidity role dominates.  
 
 
Table 5.3.                                                                                                                                                
Illiquidity presence at the interior solution with reserve requirements (with bifurcation towards a 
unique equilibrium) 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85
1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Illiquidity presence for interior with reserve requirements with r=0.3(with  bifurcation towards a unique set of 
interest rates)
Illiquidity presence for interior with reserve requirements with r=0.7 (with  bifurcation towards a unique set of 
interest rates) 
01/ θR
01/ θR
 
1 indicates presence of illiquidity, 0 indicates liquidity. 
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V.4. International lending after the bank run: Are international lenders “throwing 
good money after bad money”? 
 
Let me go back to the case when reserve requirements are not imposed. Would the 
bank fail if all depositors attempt to withdraw 1c ? Chang and Velasco (2000) answer the 
latter question in the positive. In my model because of endogenous lending, in the event 
of a bank run creditors may decide to bail out or not the bank by providing or not 12qˆ . In 
this section, I look at the role of international lending in bailing out the bank once a bank 
run happens. In the earlier section I have discussed the role of reserve requirements in 
preventing a bank run when a specific combination of },,{ 021201 θθθ  is implemented. 
Given such a result, in this section where I analyze the possibility of the post-bank run 
bailout of the bank by international lenders I do not look at the case when the 
combination of reserve requirements can induce a bank run. This would be a possible 
extension of this section in the future. 
V.4.1. International re-optimization problem 
At 1=t , when there are no reserve requirements, if a bad dream occurs, at the interior 
solution with high levels of short-term debt, a bank run will occur. Knowing that a new 
event, a bank run had occurred, international lenders would like to reconsider their 
decision on the anticipated 12qˆ . They will re-optimize given the bank run. They will 
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decide how much would be the net new lending 12x at 1=t .24 Thus at 1=t their new 
budget constraint is given by  
*
112
*
1 exc ≤+                                                                                                      (5.8) 
In equilibria where the long-term lending 0ˆ02 =q , the foreign lenders have nothing at 
stake to bail out the bank, therefore they will not provide any new funding 0ˆ12 =x ,in the 
event of a bank run. However in equilibria where 0ˆ02 >q , it might be the case that the 
international lenders will provide some new lending 012 ≥x . They would be willing to 
reconsider the value of 02qˆ : two possibilities may arise: First, given that their outside 
option is not to lend but also get nothing back of their loans, they may be willing to give 
up some of 02qˆ , they may accept partial payments of 02qˆ . Second, at 1=t  patient and 
impatient depositors withdraw 1c goods: thus no domestic depositors will be able to 
withdraw again at 2=t . International lenders know that they will be the only ones paid 
back at 2=t . They may be willing to provide 12x only by increasing the value of their 
long-term loan. Therefore they will choose new value of 02x (in terms of goods) While 
re-optimizing they take the interest rates 1202 ˆ,ˆ ρρ  found at t=0 as given. Their new 
budget constraint at 2=t is given by (5.9): 
02021212
*
0
*
2 ˆˆ xxec ρρ ++≤                                                                                  (5.9) 
International lenders will not provide any new funding if they know that despite the new 
lending the bank would still fail or if the bank liquidate all kˆ to pay back all depositors. 
                                                 
24 Note that 12xˆ would be the actual equilibrium new lending, net of the partial or full payment of 0101 ˆˆ qρ . 
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The bank has the option of liquidating early at 1=t , some or all kˆ  if she needs some 
liquidity. The bank will choose 0≥l . The magnitude of l , needed to pay the domestic 
depositors will depend on the new lending provided by international lenders. Thus the 
bailout condition of the domestic bank by international lenders is given by (5.10): 
rlxc +≤ 121ˆ                                                                                                     (5.10) 
In addition the international lenders will only give new lending if the domestic will be 
able to pay back 1212ˆ xρ  and 0202ˆ xρ . The new solvency condition at 2=t  for the 
domestic bank is given by (5.11): 
)ˆ(ˆ 02021212 lkRxx −≤+ ρρ                                                                                (5.11) 
The domestic bank does not solve any re-optimization problem since depositors, in the 
event of a bank run will withdraw 1cˆ contracted at 0=t 25. The typical international lender 
will choose lxxcc ,,,, 0212
*
2
*
1 to maximize (3.1) subject to the new budget constraints 
(5.8) and (5.9) and the bailout and solvency conditions (5.10) and (5.11). An equilibrium 
is defined as a set of allocations }ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ{ 0212
*
2
*
1 xxlcc that maximize the international 
lenders problem given the parameters and the t=0 allocations 
}ˆ,ˆ,,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,,{ 1120201
*
2
*
1 ckRree ρρρ . The solution for the optimization problem at the interior 
solution26:  
                                                 
25 Note that at t=1 when types are revealed to each individual, the role of the bank as an insurance 
mechanism disappears. The concerned reader may question for what reason the bank would still exist. 
Despite the fact that this could be an interesting research question in the future, I would like to abstract 
from it in the setup to avoid complexity.  
26 Solution for other sets of equilibria can be provided upon request.  
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For 0≥l , 012 ≥x , and for the environment to be illiquid, the early liquidation r should 
be such that: 
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Whether 0202 ˆˆ qx ≥  or 0202 ˆˆ qx ≤  will depend on the choice of 02qˆ . For consistency with 
the illiquidity condition, 02qˆ will not be too high. This is so because this re-optimization 
problem will happen only if a bank run occurs. The next section shows simulation 
results. 
V.4.2. Simulation results 
For comparability, I use the same parameter space used in the simulation for chapter 
III and IV: 20000 =e , 1* =β ; 9500*0 =e , 15000*1 =e , 150002 =e , [ ]9.0,1.0∈λ , and 
]3.2,5.1[∈R . The grid used was 0.1 for both the simulations over λ .and R . Figure 5.2 
show the simulation results for the actual net new lending 12x  vs. the anticipated net new 
lending 010112 ˆˆˆ qq ρ− . The area that is struck throughin black does not correspond to the 
interior set when 7.0=r  because it does not satisfy the condition r≥01ρˆ . At the interior 
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solution, within the corresponding parameter space, actual lending is non-negative after 
the lenders re-optimize due to the occurrence of a bank run. From the figure it is clear 
that 0=t , the anticipated net new lending is higher than the actual new lending at 1=t . 
This is due to the bank run and the early liquidation of kˆ at 1=t . In fact figure 5.3 shows 
how the ratio of early liquidation to actual net new lending 
12ˆ
ˆ
x
l  decreases to zero with 
higher R . This is because with higher R , 12x increases. Why do international lenders 
would be willing to lend at 1=t ? As explained it is because their outside option is not to 
get back anything of their loans. Since long term debt is paid back at 2=t , they are 
willing to bail out the bank to retrieve the long term debt.  
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Fig 5.2. Actual vs. anticipated new lending at 1=t , 7.0=r  
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The long term debt at stake plays a crucial role for international lenders to lend at 
1=t  short-term. ]19.1,01.1[
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
12120202
12120202 ∈+
+
qq
xx
ρρ
ρρ
. On the figure, the lines that are struck 
through correspond to equilibria that are non-existent. Thus international lenders would 
be willing to provide the new lending only if they get back a higher value of their total 
loans 12120202 ˆˆˆˆ xx ρρ +  at t=2 in comparison with the case without a bank run where the 
total indebtedness was expected to be 12120202 ˆˆˆˆ qq ρρ + . In this model at 2=t , the bank 
would still exist to liquidate )ˆˆ( lk −  and to pay back international debt 0212 ˆ,ˆ xx . There are 
no domestic expenditures for the bank. 
 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.5
2
2.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
R
lamda
l /
x1
2
 
 
Fig 5.3. Early liquidation over new lending 12ˆ/ˆ xl at 1=t  for 7.0=r  
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Figure 5.4 shows how the ratio of actual vs. anticipated total debt at t=2 increases 
with R  and decreases with λ . Note that for the high R , lˆ is zero. So all kˆ will be kept 
until 2=t . In other words, with values of high R  international lenders will be willing to 
bail out the bank, by benefiting from indirectly being the sole benefactors from kR ˆ  at 
2=t : this leads to 0ˆ =l . This is along the line of why international lenders would be 
willing to lend or to “throw good money after bad”. Results for 3.0=r  can be provided 
upon request: there for all [ ]9.0,1.0∈λ  and ]3.2,5.1[∈R  , 0ˆ =l . This is because the 
opportunity cost of early liquidation very high. 
V.5. Conclusion 
I have shown in chapter IV that reserve requirements at the interior solution creates a 
bifurcation towards either two equilibria or unique equilibrium, depending on what 
combination of },,{ 120201 θθθ  is implemented. In chapter V, simulation results show that 
a combination of },,{ 120201 θθθ  leading to two equilibria has one of the equilibria 
vulnerable to a bank run. A specific vector },,{ 120201 θθθ , that satisfies (4.6), creates a 
bifurcation towards a unique equilibrium that is not vulnerable to a bank run. Such a 
vector satisfies 011202 θθθ >> .  
For the case when there are no reserve requirements, I explore if international lenders 
would be willing to bail out the domestic bank from a bank run. Simulation results show 
that international lenders will provide new lending at t=1, if the return at t=2 will be 
 100
higher that it was anticipated at t=0, even if the new lending is lower than it was 
anticipated at t=0.  
 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5
2
2.5
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
RlamdaR
at
io
 o
f a
ct
ua
l v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 d
eb
t a
t t
=2
 (a
fte
r a
 b
an
k 
ru
n)
 
ov
er
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
ta
l d
eb
t a
t t
=2
 w
ith
ou
t a
 b
an
k 
ru
n
 
Fig 5.4. Ratio of actual total debt at t=2 (after bailout) over expected value of total debt (without a bank 
run). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I explored two issues: the choice of the maturity structure of 
external debt in an environment with liquidation cost and the role of specific type of 
capital controls. First I show that an environment with endogenous lending is essential to 
capture endogenous term structure and endogenous credit rationing. In such a rich 
environment the interest rate captures both the “reward for parting with liquidity” and the 
“impatience factor”. With endogenous behavior of lenders, multiple equilibria arise, 
some of which are characterized by indeterminacy. 
Second, I show that date-and maturity- specific reserve requirements reduce the 
scope of indeterminacy. In this model reserve requirements play the role of a tax and the 
role of liquidity providers at different dates for each bond. The scarce literature that 
explored the role of these reserve requirements has identified their tax equivalent role. 
There, the documented benefits of such capital controls are similar to the benefits of a tax 
correcting for some market failure. In my setup I capture the role of tax along with the 
role of liquidity. In fact I identify a case in which the liquidity role of reserve 
requirements dominates the tax role. In this particular case, a tilt towards a longer 
maturity structure needs the reserve requirement rate on the long-term debt to be higher 
than that on the second short-term debt, which in turn should be higher than that the first 
short-debt. With this particular combination of reserve requirements, it is possible to 
achieve no vulnerability to a bank run and to get a locally unique equilibrium. 
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Third with regard to the post-bank-run role of international lenders, I show that 
international lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after 
the occurrence of a bank run, in order to retrieve their long-term debt.  
Both the results related to pre-crisis role of reserve requirements in preventing a bank 
run and the post-crisis role of international lenders are sensitive to the assumption that 
the setup has liquidation costs in the short-term. There are several points that may seem 
to be shortcomings of the model presented in this dissertation and that are fertile points 
for future analysis. First, when I introduced the possibility of a bank run I assumed that it 
is unexpected. In the future, I would like to incorporate the expectation of a possible 
bank run within the decision making of agents in the world economy. Second when I 
look at the role of international lending after a bank run, the role of a bank is not clear. 
Third I have not explored the optimal design of reserve requirements to decrease 
vulnerability despite looking at the effect of different combination. Fourth, the shock in 
this model is related to private information regarding consumption scheme. It would be 
interesting to introduce an aggregate shock. Fifth the three-date setup is a one shot-game. 
It would be interesting to put this game in a dynamic framework; perhaps the results on 
the liquidity role vs. the tax role of reserve requirements may be different. Fourth 
introducing money and exchange rates may seem arduous but is definitely a rich future 
extension. 
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APPENDIX A 
DOMESTIC BANK’S PROBLEM 
The banks’ problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to the constraints (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6), 
and (2.7) in chapter III. In chapter II the bank’s problem has two additional constraints 
(2.2) and (2.3). 
A Lagrangean is formed: 
][ln)1(ln 1221 rccccL −+−+= ελλ                                                               (A.1) 
Using 02010 ddek ++= , one finds that: 
λ
ρ 010112
1
drldc
d−+=                                                                                       (A.2) 
λ
ρρ
−
−−−++=
1
)( 0202121202010
2
ddrlddeRc
dd
                                                (A.3) 
In chapter II, two additional borrowing constraints, (2.2) and (2.3) are added to the 
domestic bank’s problem. In this case, the domestic bank’s problem reduces to choosing 
02d  to maximize the Lagrangean in (A.1). Replacing (2.2) and (2.3) in (A.2) and (A.3), 
one finds that:  
λ
ρρ 02011012
1
)1( dffc
dd −−−=                                                                        (A.4) 
λ
ρρρ
−
−−−+=
1
)()( 02120221210
2
dffeRc
ddd
                                                    (A.5) 
Accordingly, in the problem defined in chapter II, the Kuhn-Tucker condition is the 
following: 
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02
=∂
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d
L                                                                                                      (A.6) 
where 
2
0212
1
01
02
1
ccd
L ddd ρρρ −+−=∂
∂                                                                           (A.7) 
In chapter III,  the domestic bank’s problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.4), (2.5), 
(2.6) and (2.7). There the Langragean is again (A.1) where 1c and 2c  are defined by (A.2) 
and (A.3). The domestic bank’s problem is to choose 01d , 12d  , 02d  and l  to maximize 
L . Thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:  
001
01
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d
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Proof of proposition 2.1. 
Looking at the bank’s problem, there are 2 conditions when a crisis is not anticipated: 
(i) The incentive compatibility constraint is binding 0=ε  or r>ψ  
(ii) There is no liquidation 0=l .  
The condition (ii) implies that 0<∂
∂
l
L , which in turns implies 
r
R≤ψ , where 
1
2
c
c=ψ  . 
It is straight forward from (2.5) that if there is no early liquidation, 012 >d . (Q.E.D) 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERNATIONAL LENDER’S PROBLEM  
In chapter III The lenders’ problem is to maximize (3.1) subject to the constraints (3.2), 
(3.3), and (3.4) in the text.  
A Lagrangean is formed where 
*
2
**
1
* lnln ccL β+=                                                                                          (B.1) 
where 
120101
*
1
*
1 ssec −+= ρ                                                                                          (B.2) 
12120202
*
2
*
2 ssec ρρ ++=                                                                                     (B.3) 
and 
01
*
002 ses −=                                                                                                     (B.4) 
Using The international lender problem becomes to choose 01s and 12s  to maximize 
*L . 
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APPENDIX C 
DOMESTIC BANK’S PROBLEM WITH RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
In chapter IV, the banks’ problem is to maximize (2.1) subject to the constraints 
(4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) , and (2.7) in chapter III. In this case, the Lagrangean (A.1) still 
applies.  
From the budget constraint (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), I find that: 
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2
ddlddeRc     (C.2) 
After replacing (C.1) and (C.2) in (A.1), the bank’s problem becomes to choose 01d , 12d , 
02d  and l  to maximize L . Thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are again (A.8), (A.9), 
(A.10) and (A.11), where  
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